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Abstract 
This paper analyses the Syrian conflict since 2011 in the context of the larger Middle 
East, focusing on local, regional and global actors. The first section highlights some 
geopolitical and historical factors regarding Syria. The second part outlines post-Cold 
War US and Israeli strategic debates on Syria and the Middle East. It is argued that US 
policy in the Syrian conflict since 2011 underlines the continuing significance of US-led 
regime change agendas as initially associated with the so-called “neoconservatives” and 
near unconditional US backing of Israel’s regional strategic objectives. The third 
section examines how local conflicts in Syria, since mid-March 2011, became 
transformed into a lengthy global war over world order during which the US challenged 
Russia’s long-standing geopolitical patronage of Syria’s political leadership. The 
interaction between military and political factors and the manner in which the “crisis 
narrative” was managed in the Western media system is also sketched. Finally, the 
fourth section focuses on the theory of “peripheral realism” and offers a discussion of 
this theory’s concept of state hierarchy applied to the Middle Eastern context. It is 
suggested that the war in Syria serves to destroy the existing regional state hierarchy 
and regional states’ potential capacity for upward mobility in the global state system. 
 
Keywords: Geopolitics, Middle East, peripheral realism theory, Syria, US foreign 
policy. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 In politics, actors’ intentions are usually invisible. They are hardly ever 
revealed before the event. Only the event reveals. Revealed intentions allow to 
suggest hypothesis about previous plans. In this sense, the Syrian war has been 
an exercise in revealed intentions, and more is still to come. This paper will not 
speculate about the “real” intentions of actors, but will instead look back at 
what has been revealed to everyone who carefully observed the country of Syria 
since mid-March 2011 when the current conflict started off. 
 The paper will thus provide a geopolitical analysis of the Syrian crisis. 
While Western discourse has for a long time used the highly misleading term 
“civil war”, the current paper suggests that from the very beginning it has 
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amounted to a conflict over world order with high degrees of foreign 
interference. For reasons of space, the paper focuses on the role of the US as the 
major external coordinator of the Syrian insurgency.
1
 The role of Israel as the 
leading military power in the Middle East and major factor in explaining 
regional US conduct is also highlighted. The other actors’ intentions are 
sketched more briefly.  
 The argument will proceed as follows: the first section presents long-, 
medium- and short-term geopolitical factors influencing the behaviour of the 
US on a global scale and with regard to the Middle East; the second section 
highlights US strategic debates on the Middle East and Syria since the end of 
the Cold War and puts forward a brief description of the strategic interests of 
some other state actors; the third section provides a year-by-year analysis of the 
Syrian war focusing on main events and their political significance; finally, the 
fourth section analyses the nature and characteristics of state hierarchy in the 
Middle East with particular reference to peripheral realism theory. Overall, the 
paper’s purpose is to encourage debate about the nature and degree of (Arab) 
state sovereignty under current geopolitical conditions. 
 
 
US Geopolitics And The Middle East: 
Long-, Medium- And Short-Term Factors 
 
 Geopolitics concerns the study of the impact of geographical factors on 
human history and policy-making. Many classical geopolitical authors focused 
in their writings on conflicts between sea and land powers. From the British 
maritime perspective, Halford J. Mackinder argued that the “heartland” or 
“pivot area”, located geographically at some point in central Asia, constituted 
the main centre of (land-) power in world politics. In fact, the heartland 
amounted to a natural fortress, since it was difficult or impossible to invade by 
                                               
*  Jörg Michael Dostal is Diplom-Politologe (FU Berlin), D.Phil. in Politics (St. Antony’s 
College, Oxford, 2005). Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Public 
Administration, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea, Senior Fellow, Centre for 
Syrian Studies, University of St. Andrews, Scotland. His major research interests concern 
geopolitics and international political economy. He has published on Syria before and 
since the 2011 conflict in journals such as Syria Studies and has lectured on Syria and the 
Middle East in Europe and Asia. He is an editorial board member of the Korean Journal 
of Policy Studies and the Korean-German Journal for Social Sciences 
(jmdostal@snu.ac.kr). 
1  Jeffrey Sachs, “Ending America’s disastrous role in Syria”, Asia Times, 19 February 
2018, http://www.atimes.com/ending-americas-disastrous-role-syria/.  (Accessed 30 
August 2018). 
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sea powers.
2
 From Mackinder’s perspective, world history unfolded based on 
conflict between “robbers of the steppe” invading from Asia into Europe and 
the Middle East, and “pirates from the sea” entering and dominating the coastal 
zones of the “world island” (a second term introduced by Mackinder to define the 
landmass of Asia, Europe and Africa connecting in the Middle East gateway zone). 
 This long-standing geopolitical conflict between land-based and 
maritime powers was “solved” by the Dutch (since 1928 US-American) author 
Nicholas J. Spykman. Writing during World War 2, Spykman argued that 
geopolitical hegemony was neither to be found in naval power, via control of 
trade routes and maritime choke points, nor, as argued by Mackinder, in the 
centre of Asia, which in the mid-20
th
 century mostly contained less populated 
and economically backward territories. Instead, he suggested that political and 
economic power was first and foremost concentrated in the “global rimlands” 
(Spykman’s term), namely the coastal zones of the world where most of the 
world’s population and economic activity was and still is concentrated.3  
 In adopting the point of view of the US as a major combined land and 
sea power, Spykman suggested that US “defence” could no longer be based on 
control of a single geopolitical region, such as the Western Hemisphere as 
stated in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which had demanded the European 
powers to abandon their territorial claims on the American continent. Instead, 
Spykman wanted the US to adopt a new perspective of global sovereignty in 
which all regions of the world would be placed under various degrees of direct 
US control. In this context, Spykman advocated for creating a global network of 
US permanent military bases with a particular focus on the rimlands (the coastal 
regions of Europe, the Middle East, South East and East Asia). His ideas were 
in fact realised after World War 2 and the entire world was divided into a 
number of regional US Military Commands. However, this global US approach 
did not change the fact that two of the Eurasian land powers, the Soviet Union 
and China (since 1949), remained outside of the direct reach of US power 
projections. 
 After the conclusion of World War 2, the major US policy in the 
Middle East was the Eisenhower Doctrine announced on January 5, 1957. This 
policy was based on the assertion that US military assistance would be offered 
to regional regimes against “the menace of International Communism”, since 
“[t]he free nations of the Mid East need, and for the most part want, added 
                                               
2 Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, Geographical Journal, vol. 
23, no. 4, 1904, pp. 421-437. Idem, Democratic Ideas and Reality: A Study in the Politics 
of Reconstruction, Constable and Company, London, 1919. 
3  Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace. Edited by H. R. Nichol, Harcourt, 
Brace and Company, New York, 1944. 
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strength to assure their independence”.4 In fact, the principal goal of the US 
during the early Cold War was to replace British and French influence in the 
Middle East – as agreed upon by the European powers in the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement of 1916 – with American influence. First, the US formed an 
informal coalition with Britain against France at the end of World War 2, which 
ultimately resulted in the latter’s departure from Lebanon and Syria. A decade 
later, in October 1956, the US refused to back the trilateral attack of Britain, 
France and Israel on Egypt that had been triggered by Nasser’s decision to 
nationalize the Suez channel. The refusal to back the European powers and 
Israel at this point underlined US aspirations to become the only veto power in 
the Middle East and to control all state units directly or by means of the backing 
of local actors. 
  During the 1950s, post-colonial Arab states became increasingly 
divided due to contestation over regional hegemony, such as the conflict 
between British-backed Hashemite regimes in Jordan and Iraq on the one hand 
and Saudi Arabia on the other. These intra-Arab conflicts in the Levant region 
frequently destabilised Syrian politics since the country was held to be a 
potential take-over candidate for “unification” with neighbouring Arab 
countries. The creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 (the merger with 
Nasser’s Egypt, an out-of-area state) was an effort by Syrian politicians to avoid 
take-over of Syria by Western-backed local Arab regimes.
5
 The union with 
Egypt decisively shifted Syria away from the Western pole and into the Soviet-
backed Arab camp.
6
 Subsequently, this intra-Arab conflict expanded during the 
so-called “Arab Cold War”, which set US and Soviet-backed Arab states 
against each other and allowed for further territorial expansion of the Zionist 
state on the territory of the former British Mandate of Palestine. 
 The major events during the Arab Cold War concerned first the 1958 
Iraqi revolution (the collapse of the British-backed Hashemite regime and the 
subsequent rise of nationalist and Baathist leaderships originating from the Iraqi 
military) and second the 1967 and 1973 wars between Israel and some Arab 
states, namely Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. In the 1967 war, Israel destroyed 
the Egyptian air force on the ground in a surprise attack and subsequently 
captured the Egyptian Sinai peninsula and the Syrian Golan. During the 1973 
war, the Arab states demonstrated a higher degree of intra-Arab military and 
                                               
4   Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East”, 
January 5, 1957, emphasis added, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid 
=11007 &st =&st1. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
5  Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1965. 
6  Jörg Michael Dostal, “Syria and the Great Powers (1946-1958): How Western Power 
Politics Pushed the Country Toward the Soviet Union”, Syria Studies, vol. 7, no. 4, 2015, 
pp. 7-52, https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/article/view/1284. (Accessed 30 
August 2018). 
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political solidarity performing much better against Israel, which in turn received 
large-scale economic and military support of the US. The Soviet Union reacted 
to both wars by restoring the Arab military capabilities after the wars had 
ended. Overall, the Soviet Union did not encourage the Arab states to engage in 
offensive actions out of fear that this could trigger a Third World War between 
the two major external powers in the Middle East. 
 The main concern of all actors during this period was the strategic 
balance between Israel and the Arab states, which became backed up by the US 
and the Soviet Union. The decisive event that destroyed the previously existing 
regional balance was the decision of Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat to leave the 
Arab line-up by signing a unilateral agreement with Israel in 1979. This 
agreement traded the withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab nationalist cause 
against the return of the Sinai to Egypt. This decision must count as the greatest 
success of US policy-making in the region since it permanently weakened Arab 
nationalist regimes. One can assume that the idea of “turning” Arab nationalist 
states away from the Soviet-backed camp and toward the US-backed camp has 
informed US geopolitical thinking ever since. 
 In terms of countermoves, Syria as the remaining Arab nationalist state 
bordering Israel – or rather bordering on Syrian territory which has been under 
Israeli occupation since 1967 – maintained its commitment to “strategic parity” 
with the Zionist opponent. During the Hafiz al-Assad presidency (1971-2000), 
efforts were made to achieve such parity, by concentrating Syria’s economic 
resources on the build-up and maintenance of a national security state, by 
improving relations with some conservative Arab states such as Saudi Arabia in 
order to gain additional economic resources from outside, by engaging in efforts 
to end the long-term conflict with Saddam Hussein’s Baath regime in Iraq and, 
finally, by signing a mutual defence agreement with the Islamic Republic of 
Iran after Saddam’s attack on Iran in 1980.7  
 The end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union and First Gulf 
War after the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait (1990-1991) all underlined that Syria 
was in fact not able to sustain strategic parity with Israel due to the latter’s 
vastly superior external funding and military sponsorship by the US. In reaction 
to this steady deterioration of the Syrian position, new efforts were made to 
create an asymmetric defence axis consisting of Syria, Iran and the Iran-backed 
Lebanese Hezbollah militia. The hope was that this “Axis of Resistance” would 
produce a new strategic balance that would avoid overstretching Syria’s limited 
resources and would still maintain pressure on Israel in terms of pushing for the 
return of the occupied Syrian Golan and providing deterrence against Israeli 
                                               
7  Eberhard Kienle, Ba’ath Versus Ba’ath: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989, 
I. B. Tauris, London, 1991; P. Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, 
revised edn, Berkeley, Cal., University of California Press, 1995. 
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attacks.
8
 Nevertheless, more recent events, such as the Anglo-American 
occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the pressure being put on Syria to withdraw its 
troops from Lebanon in 2005 all further weakened Syria’s regional position. 
They prepared the ground for US efforts at regime change in Syria that were 
officially announced in 2003 and were subsequently carefully followed up on.
9
 
 Summing up long-, medium- and short-term geopolitical factors, the 
focus of US policy-makers on the global rimlands and in particular on the oil 
and gas-rich Arab peninsula produced the US aspiration to place permanent US 
military bases in each Arab state unit in the region and/or to maintain high 
degrees of economic, military and political dependency of all Arab state 
executives on US backing. In this context, the Cold War period did not deliver 
on US aspirations, however. Instead, an asymmetric balance of power was 
maintained due to the Soviet Union’s sponsorship of some Arab nationalist 
regimes and efforts of some other Arab states, such as North Yemen, to 
maintain an unaligned posture.  
 After the end of the Cold War and again following the September 11, 
2001 events, the medium-term strategy of the US was to remove all remnants of 
the old order in the region, by firmly acquiring the position of only external 
balancer in the Middle East, by removing all remaining Arab nationalist 
regimes, and by resisting efforts of old and new out-of-area countries such as 
Russia, China and Iran to enter the region. This can also be described as the 
transition from a war of position in a bipolar regional system with relatively 
fixed rules – namely that the Soviet Union would not encourage offensive 
action of its clients in the region but would defend them against attack – to a 
war of movement in which there are no longer any shared rules.  
 The volatility of this situation is further increased due to the 
contradiction between US advances in the region – Libya, Yemen and Iraq have 
all experienced state collapse due to direct or indirect US military action in 
combination with local forces – while the global US position is in other 
respects, such as on the economic plane when measured in terms of this 
country’s share of global GDP, deteriorating. These multi-layered 
contradictions suggest a general increase of volatility in the international 
system. In this context, Syria became the space in which these contradictions 
would trigger a long war of attrition that was in the initial phase mostly fought 
by way of proxy forces and covert action before the great powers started to 
officially intervene with their own troops since 2015. 
 
                                               
8  Susanne Krause, Strategische Ambivalenz? – Die strategische Kultur Syriens unter Hafiz 
und Bashar al-Assad, Münster, Lit-Verlag, 2016, pp. 16, 45. 
9  Wikileaks “INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END OF 2006”, 13 December [author 
William V. Roebuck], 06DAMASCUS5399-a, 2006, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06D 
  AMASCUS5399_a.html. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
Syria’s Global War and Beyond  357 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII no. 3  2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Road To The Syrian War: 
US Strategic Debates On The Middle East Since The End Of 
The Cold War 
 
 During the Cold War, US strategy in the Middle East was relatively 
static and predictable. In particular, US-backed Arab states enjoyed security 
guarantees for regime survival, as initially set out in the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
The US and the Soviet Union jointly provided bilateral stability, exercising a 
restraining influence on local actors, while the regional role of all other external 
powers, such as Britain, France and pre- and post-1979 Iran, was very limited 
by comparison. After the unexpected 1979 collapse of the Shah’s US-backed 
regime in Iran, US security guarantees for regional clients – first and foremost 
Israel and secondly Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies – were further 
propped up to ensure that no popular uprising would ever again make a regional 
state exit from the US security umbrella. Following on the US military success 
in the First Gulf War in 1991, the strategic situation changed once more 
fundamentally due to the removal of Soviet constraints on US regional conduct.  
 In a frequently quoted statement delivered on March 2, 2007, the 2004 
Democratic Party presidential primary contender and retired four-star US 
general Wesley Clark recalled a 1991 conversation with Paul Wolfowitz, the 
then US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in which the latter is held to have 
said the following: “[O]ne thing we did learn [from the First Gulf War] is that 
we can use our military in the region – in the Middle East – and the Soviets 
won't stop us. And we've got about five or 10 years to clean up those old Soviet 
regimes – Syria, Iran [sic], Iraq – before the next great superpower comes on to 
challenge us”.10 In the same talk, Clark also alleges that he visited the Pentagon 
                                               
10  Quoted in Glenn Greenwald, “Wes Clark and the neocon dream”, Salon, November 26, 
2011, https://www.salon.com/2011/11/26/wes_clark_and_the_neocon_dream/ (accessed 
30 August 2018). The Clark talk delivered on 2 March 2007 is also widely available on 
YouTube. One might interpret Clark’s presentations as an attempt at criticising the so-
called “neocons” from a “patriotic” perspective during the second Bush Jr. presidency. In 
a less-frequently quoted statement, delivered on October 3, 2007, Clark also alleged the 
following: “They [the neocons] could hardly wait to finish Iraq so that they could move 
into Syria” [excerpt from minute 1:05]. According to Clark, “this wasn’t what the 
American people voted George Bush into office for…. It wasn’t what he campaigned on. 
He campaigned on a humble foreign policy [but voters instead got] the most arrogant 
foreign policy in American history”, “Wesley Clark – This Country was Taken Over by a 
Group of People”, 25 March 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzmW8c66UaI 
(accessed 30 August 2018). The same words also apply to the current US President 
Donald J. Trump, particularly after his decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran 
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some days after September 11, 2001 and was briefed by one his former junior 
officers as follows: “I just got this memo [from the Secretary of Defense's 
office]. This is a memo that describes how we’re going to take out seven 
countries in five years starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, 
Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran”.11 
 What is most significant about US strategic thinking in the Middle East 
post-Cold War is the relative continuity of purpose from 1991 until the present. 
The goal has been under all administrations (Bush Sr., Clinton, Bush Jr., Obama 
and now Trump) to advance “regime change” in all opponent states in the 
region.
12
 In order to achieve this purpose, different tactical means have been 
applied. Many analysts tend to underestimate this element of continuity of 
purpose. Instead, they have focused almost exclusively on the so-called 
“neoconservatives” (commonly referred to as the “neocons”), a group of 
defence intellectuals including people such as Paul Wolfowitz, William Kristol, 
John Bolton and Robert Kagan, that was blamed for the relative failure of the 
Bush Jr. presidency to pacify Iraq after the 2003 US invasion. Sophisticated 
observers of the neocons have stressed, however, that their strong influence on 
US foreign policy was only possible because they were organically embedded 
with the US foreign policy mainstream, namely those that one might describe as 
“American nationalists” for lack of a better term.13  
 The leading neocons were all hosted and nurtured within mainstream 
US institutions such as the American Enterprise Institute and the RAND 
Corporation. Moreover, long-term neocons such as Wolfowitz had already, 
since the early 1970s, collaborated with the earlier Cold War generation of US 
defence intellectuals, including Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, and began to set 
the strategic agenda under the Bush Sr. administration with documents such as 
the “Defence Planning Guidance” of 1992.14 In addition, official US 
commitment to regime change in Iraq and the sanctioning of Syria as 
preparation for regime change was announced in 1998 and 2003 – the “Iraq 
                                                                                                                   
nuclear deal and due to his support for moving the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem against public opinion across the Arab world. 
11 “Plan for Middle East – U.S. Army Gen. Wesley Clark”, 9 November 2013, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rz5fZziMWEE. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
12  Jörg Michael Dostal, “Transnational War in Syria: The Eisenhower Doctrine in the 21st 
Century?”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 16, no. 2, 2016, 
pp. 179-218. 
13  One should note that the US foreign policy mainstream does not attract any descriptive 
label in the way the neocons did. Instead, observers usually stress the existence of 
presidential Doctrines, which downplays the high degree of continuity in US foreign 
policy-making since the end of the Cold War, namely to fill post-Soviet spaces with US 
influence and to tightly contain Russia and China. 
14  Aggie Hirst, Leo Strauss and the Invasion of Iraq: Encountering the Abyss, Routledge, 
London, 2013, pp. 57-61, pp. 83-89. 
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Liberation Act” and the “Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 
Restoration Act” – and was carried over and applied under the subsequent 
administrations. 
 Briefly, the reason for the influence of the neocons on the US foreign 
policy agenda in the Middle East and elsewhere is that all three major 
approaches in US foreign policy, namely neoclassical realism, liberal 
internationalism and neoconservatism share the concern with US primacy in the 
international system. Neoclassical realists reject multilateralism and 
multipolarity and want to maintain US regional hegemony in Asia, Europe and 
the Middle East. Their “hybrid discourse of hegemonic restraint” concerns 
means rather than ends.
15
 Thus, their commitment to exercising hegemonic 
control of what Spykman termed the global rimlands is beyond doubt.  
 In turn, liberal internationalists favour “deep engagement” with regional 
allies in the context of “cooperative security partnerships (…) clearly executed 
under American hegemony (…) rather than as an alternative to it”.16 This 
particular form of US leadership “predominantly served to realize the 
established hegemony of the United States in a more cost-effective and 
cooperative fashion, not to fundamentally redefine America’s role in world 
politics”.17 Thus, it has been pointed out that the neocons “merely represented a 
particular military power-centric, unilateral, and expansive definition of the 
mainstream consensus on American hegemony, which, under Obama, continued 
to dominate in most of the political class and expert circles of US foreign policy 
in Washington DC”.18 
 When looking at the Obama presidency, therefore, it is not surprising 
that policy-making always remained within the constraints of the three 
dominant approaches. Directly after entering office, Obama criticised the high 
costs of his predecessor’s policies with regard to the military campaigns in Iraq 
and elsewhere. However, the basic paradigm of US unilateral action remained 
in place and policy debate became focused on how to achieve similar objectives 
at a lower cost. This produced the Obama administration’s preference for 
unconventional warfare activities such as covert warfare, use of proxy forces 
and drone attacks rather than US military interventions with soldiers on the 
ground. This new style of power politics brought down the political threshold 
                                               
15  Georg Löfflmann, American Grand Strategy under Obama: Competing Discourses, 
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2017, p. 106. 
16  Ibidem, p. 100. 
17  Ibidem, p. 112. 
18  Ibidem, p. 100. A fourth alternative approach in US foreign policy-making would be 
focusing on collective security based on multipolarity. However, this would indicate the 
end of US primacy in the international system, which is inconceivable in the context of 
the three mainstream approaches. 
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for engaging in armed conflict; namely the number of states affected by US 
military incursions expanded further when compared to the Bush Jr. administration. 
During the Obama years, the new style “limited” warfare translated 
into a vast increase in the number of conflict points. The drone warfare 
programme, in particular, was massively expanded starting with an initial focus 
on the Horn of Africa and subsequently spreading to at least 46 sites across 
Central Africa and also covering the Arab peninsula by the time when Obama 
left office. Such policies further destabilised already fragile states whose sovereignty 
was treated as non-existent from the point of view of US policy-makers.
19
 
 Another major influence on the post-Cold War US strategy in the 
Middle East is to be found in national security debates in Israel since the 1980s. 
The so-called “Yinon Plan” published in a Zionist journal in 1982 described the 
entire Arab world as a “house of cards” suggesting that “every Arab Moslem 
state nowadays faces ethnic social destruction from within”.20 The same article 
– worth quoting at length due to its closeness to the current situation in 2018 – 
argued further that:  
 
 “Lebanon’s total dissolution [during the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1989] into five 
provinces serves as a precedent for the entire Arab world including Egypt, Syria, Iraq 
and the Arabian peninsula (…) Syria will fall apart, in accordance with its ethnic and 
religious structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon, so that there will 
be a Shi’ite Alawi state along its coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni 
state in Damascus hostile to its northern neighbour (…) Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand 
and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel’s targets. Its 
dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria 
(…) Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us [Israel] in the short run and 
will shorten the way to the more important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations 
as in Syria and in Lebanon”.21 
 
 The article also suggests that “liquidation of Jordan under the present 
[Hashemite] regime” would allow the Palestinians “[a] nation of their own”.22 
At the time of publication, such expectations for the collapse of the Arab states 
                                               
19  Nick Turse, Tomorrow’s Battlefield: US Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa, Dispatch Books, 
Chicago, IL, 2015. Idem, “The U.S. Military Moves Deeper into Africa”, Tomdispatch.com, 27 
April 2017, http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176272/tomgram%3A_nick_turse%2C_ 
the_u.s._military_moves_deeper_into_africa. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
20  Oded Yinon, “A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties”, orig. Hebrew published in 
KIVUNIM, A Journal for Judaism and Zionism, World Zionist Organization, Department 
of Information, Jerusalem, no. 14, February 1982, no page numbers, transl. by Israel 
Shahak, http://www.redressonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/A-Strategy-for-
Israel-in-the eteen-Eighties-Oded-Yinon.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2018). The author 
served with a number of Israeli ministries in the 1970s. 
21  Ibidem. 
22  Ibidem. 
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along ethnic and sectarian lines would have been considered conceivable but 
perhaps not likely.  
 In a 1996 paper principally written by David Wurmser and signed by 
Richard Perle and other neocons for the then incoming Likud government of 
Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel was therefore advised to turn to a more offensive 
policy. The paper mostly concerned itself with “strategic balance in the Middle 
East” suggesting “redrawing of the map in the Middle East which would 
threaten Syria’s territorial integrity”.23 The same paper also suggested direct 
military attacks on Syria to push for state collapse. Contrary to the Yinon paper, 
however, the 1996 account holds that Israel should base its strategy on alliances 
with Turkey and Jordan. It is argued that Israel “has an interest supporting 
diplomatically, militarily and operationally Turkey’s and Jordan’s actions 
against Syria, such as securing tribal alliances with Arab tribes that cross into 
Syrian territory and are hostile to the Syrian ruling elite”.24 Observing the 
Syrian insurgency since 2011 suggests that this scenario has been fully 
implemented. 
 Thus, US strategic debates about the Middle East are intimately linked 
with those conducted in Israel. This is not simply due to the close alliance 
between the two countries. Rather, the main point of departure after the end of 
the Cold War was a strategic debate in Washington and Tel Aviv about whether 
Israel should be integrated into the Middle East by means of “normalization” 
proceeding along the lines of regional economic integration and in the larger 
context of “globalisation”. Such policies, if enacted, would have suggested 
serious negotiations on the part of Israel with the Palestinians and Arab 
neighbouring states, compromise over land rights and the return of the occupied 
Syrian Golan. The decisive development was, however, that US and Israeli 
leaders firmly went for a no-compromise scenario based on further expansion of 
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories thinly veiled by a so-called “peace 
process” that essentially obscured US backing of further Israeli expansionism. 
 The post-Cold War point of departure of US debates on the Middle East 
was the “Defense Planning Guidance” of 1992, authored by Wolfowitz and 
others. It suggested in line with Spykman’s views and the Eisenhower Doctrine 
that the US “overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the 
region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil. (…) [I]t 
                                               
23  Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, “A Clean Break: A New Strategy 
for Securing the Realm”, 1996, no page numbers, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140125123844 
/http://www.iasps.org/strat1.htm. (Accessed 30 August 2018). The Institute was an Israel-
based think tank funded by private foundations with an office in Washington, D.C. that 
closed around 2005. The authors associated with the report were at the same time 
employed in other more mainstream think tanks and some of them later obtained posts 
during the Bush Jr. presidency. 
24  Ibidem. 
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remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon [other than the US] or 
alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the 
Arabian peninsula”.25  
 The founding of the “Project for a New American Century” (PNAC) by 
Kristol and Kagan in 1997 and the 1998 open letter signed by Wolfowitz, 
Kristol and others and send by a “Committee for Peace and Security in the 
Gulf”, an outfit that overlapped with PNAC, asking President Clinton to bring 
down Saddam Hussein and his regime set the new agenda for US conduct in the 
Middle East. Complementary ideas were advanced in a PNAC report titled 
“Rebuilding America’s Defenses”, which supported forward defence, namely 
“forward-based Army units can become ‘change-agents’ (…) opening 
opportunities for transformational concepts, even as they perform vital stability 
operations in their regions”.26 A specific demand regarding the Middle East 
concerned efforts “to get the Saudis, Kuwaitis and other Gulf states to assume a 
greater share of the costs” and to make them accept US troops on their 
territories as “a de facto permanent presence, even as it seeks ways to lessen 
Saudi, Kuwaiti and regional concerns about U.S. presence”.27 
 After September 11, 2001, the US strategic debate on the Middle East 
focused on re-defining the enemy (who was to blame?), on US military 
operations in Afghanistan, and on the preparation for attacking and occupying 
Iraq. During this period, the neocons started to reshape public opinion by means 
of politicised intelligence production, which bypassed “traditionalists” in the 
US intelligence community who continued to insist on “positivism”, namely the 
rejection of intelligence lacking reasonable proof backing it up.
28
 In fact, the 
new approach of “strategic denial and deception relate[s] to the withholding and 
fabrication of information at the highest levels of government and the political 
establishment (…) influencing a target through the withholding of information 
and the creation of substitute information in order to direct the target’s view of a 
given state of affairs”.29  
                                               
25  Principal Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense, “Memorandum” [FY 94-99 Defense 
Planning Guidance], 18 February 1992, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ 
ebb245/doc03_extract_nytedit.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
26  Project for the New American Century, “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, 
Forces and Resources For a New Century”, September 2000, p. 28, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130501130739/http://www.newamericancentury.org/Rebui
ldingAmericasDefenses.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2018). The insertion of US Special 
Forces in North Syria, operating alongside Kurdish militias since 2015, could be 
considered a practical demonstration of the concept. 
27  Ibidem, pp. 34-35. 
28  W. Patrick Lang, “Drinking the Kool-Aid”, Middle East Policy, vol. 11, no. 2, 2004, pp. 
39-60. 
29  Hirst, Leo Strauss…cit., p. 92. 
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 This politicisation of intelligence production was referred to as 
“stovepiping”, namely the “direct feed of unsubstantiated information straight 
to the highest levels of the political establishment”.30 In this context, Wolfowitz 
suggested that “we must also accelerate the speed with which information is 
passed to policymakers and operators. We cannot wait for critical intelligence to 
be processed, coordinated, edited and approved – we must accept the risks 
inherent in posting critical information before it is processed”.31 
 Following on the US/UK occupation of Iraq in 2003, a second wave of 
US strategic debate occurred. One account now suggested that the future US 
global strategy had to address the “gap” between a “functioning core” of states, 
namely the US and other OECD societies together with China, Russia and 
India, on the one hand, and a so-called “non-integrating gap” consisting of the 
rest of the world, including all Middle Eastern states, Turkey and Central Asia, 
on the other. This concept was presented as the “Pentagon’s New Map” and 
gained global attention due to its open advocacy for pre-emptive US warfare to 
police the non-integrating gap on a permanent basis. According to the author, 
“we are talking about America playing Gap Leviathan” and “[t]here is no 
exiting the Gap (…) we’d better stop kidding ourselves about ‘exit strategies’. 
No exit means no exit strategy”.32 The same account recommended the further 
expansion of US military bases “dotting the Gap” to deliver “connectivity” 
between the functioning core and the Gap states.
33
 Thus, this political vision 
focused on permanence of conflict in US efforts to “shrink the Gap” and, in the 
context of the Middle East, to pressure Iraq, Iran and Syria in the context of 
“rule-set export” that clarifies that “we [the US] hold Damascus responsible for 
what goes on in Lebanon vis-à-vis Israel”.34  
 Another account put forward ideas for a US-led full-scale reordering of 
the Middle East based on “Blood borders”. This was meant to indicate the re-
drawing of regional borders along ethnic and sectarian lines based on the partial 
dismantling of Syria and Iraq in favour of a new Kurdish state. In addition, the 
radical downsizing of the territories of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran in favour 
of newly created more homogeneous statelets – in line with the ideas voiced by 
Yinon back in 1982 – was suggested.35 One could possibly conceive such 
                                               
30  Ibidem, p. 93. 
31  Wolfowitz, quoted in Gordon R. Mitchell, “Team B Intelligence Coups”, Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, vol. 92, no. 2, 2006, p. 158. 
32  Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first 
Century, Berkley Books, New York, 2004, pp. 175, 179, emphasis in the original. For a 
critical evaluation, see Justin Logan, “Are Great-Power Politics Extinct?”, Orbis, vol. 50, 
no. 2, 2006, pp. 380-390. 
33  Barnett, New Map…cit., p. 179. 
34  Ibidem, p. 289. 
35      Ralph Peters, “Blood borders”, Armed Forces Journal, June 1, 2006, 
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project in two ways, namely as a de facto redrawing of borders, by weakening 
Arab central state authorities to an extent that results in the quasi collapse of the 
central government’s ability to control its own territory or, more radically, by de 
jure redrawing of borders, namely by creating new states in places where they 
do not exist today.  
 Yet one must wonder whether the US really has any strategic interest in 
redrawing Middle Eastern state borders. In fact, most of the Arab states are 
already highly dependent on the US for their “security”. They are hosting 
permanent US military bases and their political autonomy is very limited. 
Perhaps the interests of the US and Israel are best served in combining the 
strategy of Barnett’s “Gap Leviathan” with a more limited de facto weakening 
of those Arab states that do not accept US regional leadership, namely Syria, 
Iran and probably also Iraq. In this context, Israeli policy-makers might face 
some tactical disagreements with the US regarding the potential creation of a 
Kurdish state.
36
 While the former would welcome this development, the latter 
must balance between Israel and Turkey in this matter and, in addition, must 
also consider whether de jure change of regional borders is going to cast doubt 
on international norms against conquest and annexation that have generally 
been strengthened in the world since 1945.
37
  
 Between 2003 and 2011, a number of political and economic events 
changed the relationship between the Syrian leadership and the US and other 
Western powers. First, the 2005 assassination of the former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri, a close regional ally of Saudi Arabia and France, was 
blamed on Syria, although without any conclusive evidence. Subsequently, 
Western powers increased their pressure on Syria to withdraw its troops from 
Lebanon where they had been stationed since the end of the 1982 Lebanese 
Civil War. Withdrawing troops under pressure deteriorated the Syrian regional 
position, although the subsequent inconclusive 2006 war between Israel and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon suggested that the “Axis of Resistance” might be able to 
continue to balance Israel in the region in a more indirect manner.  
 Around the same time, the Western powers experimented with policies 
regarding engagement, sanctioning or confrontation of the Syrian leadership. 
First, efforts were made to make Syria join a Free Trade Agreement with the 
European Union (EU). In this context, the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was 
briefly courted by the then French President Sarkozy, although the EU 
                                                                                                                   
 http://armedforcesjournal.com/blood-borders/ (accessed 30 August 2018). For the map, 
see “The Empire’s New Middle East Map”, 2014, http://www.oilempire.us/new-
map.html. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
36  Lahav Harkov, “MK Pushes Israel to Recognize Kurdistan as an Independent State”, 
Jerusalem Post, 21 May 2018. 
37  Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, 
and Annexation, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2007, pp. 169-228. 
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ultimately did not ratify the resulting Agreement.
38
 A second project concerned 
the construction of a gas pipeline to connect the largest currently known gas 
field in the world, North Dome/South Pars, shared between Qatar and Iran, with 
European markets. The projected gas pipeline would have connected Qatar via 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria with Turkey and the European Union. However, 
the Syrian President rejected this project in favour of a so-called “Islamic 
pipeline” that would instead connect the same gas field from the Iranian side 
with Iraq and Syria.
39
 Crucially, a forced change of government in Damascus 
would potentially allow Qatar to capture some of the Russian market share of 
gas exports to the EU
40
. 
 Since March 18, 2011, the Syrian conflict has created a new strategic 
challenge for the US. Why did the Syrian conflict come about? What major 
political and economic factors need to be considered to explain the current 
situation? To be sure, there exists no single answer, but rather multiple 
overlapping answers.  
 The best starting point is to acknowledge that the struggle is first and 
foremost political, namely the major factor is the longstanding clash between 
US regional hegemonic demands and the Syrian state class centred around the 
Syrian President Assad and the relevant institutions of the Syrian state, namely 
the army and security services, the Baath Party and other Syrian state 
institutions, such as ministries and public sector bureaucracies. This conflict 
goes back at least to the mid-1950s, thereby predating the Baath leadership of 
Syria. It also relates to the larger question of degrees of political autonomy of 
developing countries in a US-dominated global system.
41
 It needs to be clearly 
stated that the conflict between the US and the Syrian state is a US war of 
choice for regime change similar to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Obama and 
Trump presidencies have fuelled the conflict in Syria because they believe/d 
that covert warfare, mostly conducted by proxies and regional allies and led 
“from behind” by the US, will impose high costs on US opponents, make allies 
more dependent on US guidance and will inflict only limited costs on the US. 
                                               
38  Jörg Michael Dostal, “The European Union and Economic Reform in Syria”, in Jörg 
Michael Dostal, Anja Zorob, Syria and the Euro-Mediterranean Relationship, Lynne 
Rienner, Bolder, Col., 2008, pp. 5-35. 
39  Dimitry Minin, “The Geopolitics of Gas and the Syrian Crisis”, Strategic Culture 
Foundation, 31 May 2013, https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/05/31/the-
geopolitics-of-gas-and-the-syrian-crisis.html. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
40  Nafeez Ahmed, “Western firms primed to cash in on Syria’s oil and gas ‘frontier’”, 1 
December 2015, https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/western-firms-plan-to-cash-in-
on-syria-s-oil-and-gas-frontier-6c5fa4a72a92. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
41  Alan Freeman, Boris Kagarlitsky, “Introduction: World Empire – or a World of 
Empires?”, in Alan Freeman, Boris Kagarlitsky (eds), The Politics of Empire: 
Globalization in Crisis, Pluto Press, London, 2004, pp. 13, 26. 
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 In this broader context, one might identify the following main political 
reasons for the US behaviour vis-à-vis Syria: (1) the US desire for “imperial 
prestige”, namely the control of all state units in the Middle East by means of 
construction of permanent US military bases in line with the aspirations first 
announced in the Eisenhower Doctrine. In this context, the removal of the 
Syrian anomaly, namely of an Arab nationalist state with a substantial degree of 
sovereignty outside of the US security umbrella, appears as an effort to finally 
settle a long-standing geopolitical disagreement; (2) the US policy regarding 
Syria aims to deliver a clear message to all regional actors, namely that the US 
has the means and political willpower to deny dissenting Arab state leaders 
access to their own territory, thereby making what remains of Arab sovereignty 
conditional on good behaviour as judged by the US; (3) the US aims to break 
the “Axis of Resistance”, namely the mutual defence alliance of Syria and Iran 
going back to the early 1980s and the shared support of both states for the 
Hezbollah movement in Lebanon; (4) the US do not want to see any integration 
of Iraq into this Axis; (5) the US aspires to force Russia to leave the Middle 
East and to limit China’s future access to the region as far as possible; (6) the 
US are not committed to the territorial integrity of Syria as long as the 
Damascus government does not accept client status. Thus, the US invaded 
Syrian territories in 2015 stationing troops east of the Euphrates River – 
embedded with the Kurdish YPG militia – in order to control a large share of 
Syria’s oil and water resources and to shield Israel from any regional 
combination of Arab forces, such as an alliance of Syria, Iraq and Iran. 
 In terms of economic motivations, one might point out the following 
main factors: (1) the US has a preference for weak regional clients, namely 
making Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey enter a long-standing war of attrition in 
Syria (and in the Saudi case also in Yemen) allows to increase the structural 
dependence of these states on US patronage in terms of selling weapons and 
maintaining a dollar-denominated trading system for oil and gas; (2) the US 
might accommodate aspirations of regional states to construct new oil and gas 
pipelines that would depend on US military backing and would also help to 
limit Russia’s future access to the European energy market; (3) the US has an 
interest to keep competing states, such as Russia, China and EU members, from 
building close bilateral economic relationships with Arab states. In this context, 
US acceptance of the (re-) entry of former colonial powers – France and the UK 
– into the Arab region as military actors under US guidance also helps to further 
divide the European powers. 
 In order to very briefly summarize the political interests of the other 
most relevant actors in the Syrian conflict, the Table 1 sums up the revealed 
intentions of major regional states and Russia which in turn helps to explain US 
regional behaviour. 
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Table 1: Revealed intentions of state actors in the Syrian conflict 
Country Revealed Intentions Possible Evolutions 
Israel 
 Regular air attacks on Syrian and 
Iranian military positions in Syria to 
demonstrate Israel’s willingness to 
ignore Syrian sovereignty  
 Financial, logistical and military 
support for Islamist groups fighting the 
Syrian army 
 Support for the creation of a Kurdish 
state made up of Syrian and Iraqi 
territory  
 Effort to engage in multilateral 
alliance building to overcome sole 
dependency on US (e.g. Saudi 
Arabia, Russia) 
 Continuing one-sided air war on 
Syria due to Syria’s lack of 
advanced air defence systems 
 Avoid closer relations between 
Iraq and the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah 
alliance 
Saudi 
Arabia 
 Funding and arming of Islamist groups 
fighting in Syria 
 Effort to construct oil/gas pipeline from 
Qatar via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and 
Syria toward the EU 
 Avoid US blame for proliferation of 
Islamist groups by sharing 
responsibility with the US 
 Compete with Iran for regional 
influence 
 Further deepening of structural 
dependency on US (e.g. increasing 
arms purchases and growing state 
debt) 
 Costly war of attrition in Yemen 
 Structural pressure to retrench 
state spending and reform socio-
economic system 
Qatar 
 Funding and arming of Islamist groups 
fighting in Syria (esp. Muslim 
Brotherhood) 
 Effort to construct oil/gas pipeline from 
Qatar via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and 
Syria toward the EU 
 “Swing diplomacy” between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran to avoid 
diplomatic isolation 
 Continuing reliance on US 
military base to guarantee 
statehood  
Turkey 
 Funding and arming of Islamist groups 
fighting in Syria (esp. Muslim Brotherhood) 
 Direct and indirect occupation of 
‘zones of influence’ in Syria 
 Effort to stop the US arming of Kurdish 
militias in north Syria 
 “Swing diplomacy” to avoid 
outside interference in support of 
Kurdish nationalism 
 Avoid diplomatic isolation 
 Complete joint gas pipeline project 
“Turkish Stream” with Russia 
Iran 
 Strengthening of alliance with Syria 
and Hezbollah  
 Funding of Syrian statehood 
 Increasing collaboration with Russia 
 Avoid diplomatic isolation 
 Focus on deepening of multilateral 
relations with Russia, Turkey and China  
 Maintenance of domestic stability 
 Avoid isolation with regard to the 
Iranian nuclear deal 
Russia 
 Defense of Syrian statehood 
 Fight Islamist groups outside of Russia 
 Exercise diplomatic leadership in the 
Middle East by advancing multilateralism 
against US unilateralism 
 Gain “referee status” in policing local 
Syrian ceasefires and regional de-
escalation zones 
 Maintain Russian military bases in 
Syria 
 Strengthen regional diplomatic 
influence 
 Complete joint gas pipeline project 
“Turkish Stream” with Turkey 
 Advance concept of multipolar 
world order 
Source: Jörg Michael Dostal, “Transnational War…”, cit.; Dimitry Minin, “The Geopolitics…”, cit.; 
Amos Harel, “To Push Iran Back, Israel Ramps Up Support for Syrian Rebels, ‘Arming 7 Different 
Groups’”, Haaretz, 21 February 2018; Anna Ahronheim, “IDF Confirms: Israel Provided Light-
weapons to Syrian Rebels”, Jerusalem Post, 5 September 2018; and national news media coverage. 
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Syria Since 2011: From Local Conflict To Global World Order War 
 
 This section provides a brief analysis of the conflict in Syria between 
18 March 2011 and August 2018. In order to deal with the large body of highly 
contested information and the permanent shift in public discourses around the 
world about why the Syrian conflict emerged and why it has persisted for so 
long, two guiding questions are applied. First, how has the battle for global 
public opinion been conducted, namely who is to blame for the war in Syria? 
This question concerns the “crisis narrative” and its permanent mutation since 
2011. Second, how did the military escalation from limited localized conflicts to 
a near-global confrontation fought on multiple levels within Syria and with 
repercussions across the world occur? These two related questions will be 
briefly discussed on a year-by-year basis. 
 The Syrian conflict began in the southern border town of Daraa on 18 
March 2011. The exact nature of the Daraa events remains contested, but there 
were some civilian and state official casualties on the first day and more 
casualties in the days to follow. In subsequent weeks, minor rallies against the 
Syrian government took place in numerous locations. These occurred after 
Friday prayers and mostly included the shouting of religious and anti-
government slogans. The Syrian government responded to the protests with 
efforts to mobilize public opinion in favour of government-led political reforms. 
There were at least three major mobilization waves in March and November 
2011 and in February and March 2012 in favour of government-led reforms. In 
2012, a popular referendum about amendments to Syria’s Constitution was held 
and approved, namely the leading role of the Baath Party was removed from the 
Constitution and a multi-party system was introduced. 
 When comparing the size of pro- and anti-government popular 
mobilisations in 2011 and 2012, the government-organised rallies were the 
largest ever political mobilizations in the history of the country while the 
opposition rallies were very small by comparison. This dramatic difference in 
mobilisation levels was “explained” by opposition activists as mostly due to 
government repression. A significant opinion-shaping factor during 2011 and 
early in 2012 was the effort on the part of US-funded NGOs, the US Embassy 
and the Qatar-based Al Jazeera TV to document Syrian events by distributing 
smart phones and cameras to produce “online coverage” of “government 
violence” in order to contribute to a “Facebook revolution”.42 
                                               
42  The current author would like to acknowledge that full coverage of disinformation in the 
context of the Syrian conflict is beyond the scope of this article and requires at least a 
book-length treatment. Briefly focusing on the issue of Al Jazeera’s disinformation on 
Syria during the early stage of the conflict, one might highlight the following exemplary 
sources: Investigative Project on Terrorism, “Al-Jazeera Director Resigns in Protest of 
Coverage”, 25 April 2011, https://www.investigativeproject.org/2789/al-jazeera-director-
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 Previously, since 2006, the US had already provided covert funding for 
anti-Syrian government media outlets.
43
 In the early period of the conflict, the 
term “Shabiha”, which had been in use in Syria since the 1980s and initially 
described pretty criminals and smugglers of Alevite origin (the sect to which the 
Assad family belongs), was excessively used by anti-Syrian government media 
– namely outlets funded by Qatar and Saudi Arabia – to “brand” the Syrian 
government as illegitimate and criminal. The proliferation of media claims that 
the Syrian state attacked peaceful demonstrators demanding freedom was a 
major public relations success for those pushing for regime change in Syria. On 
the other hand, the Syrian government’s insistence that the situation was 
“normal” or “returning to normal” was counterproductive. In fact, it was 
challenged by a never-ending stream of online news coverage amounting to an 
“open-ended media campaign against the Syrian government”.44 
 Long-term observers of Syrian affairs questioned media claims about 
one-sided violence originating with the Syrian government against “peaceful” 
demonstrators. One prominent observer, the Belgian-born Father Frans van der 
Lugt, who had lived in Syria since the mid-1960s and observed the events in his 
residential city of Homs before he was murdered by Islamist insurgents in the 
same city in 2014, stated in 2012: “From the start the protest movements were 
not purely peaceful. From the start I saw demonstrators marching along in the 
                                                                                                                   
resigns-in-protest-of-coverage. (Accessed 30 August 2018). The resignation of Tunisian 
journalist Ghassan Bin Jeddo, former Al Jazeera Beirut bureau chief, who called the 
network after his resignation “an operations room for incitement and mobilization”, was 
also covered by a number of websites with opposing political views, suggesting that the 
media system was in the early stages of the Syrian conflict still willing to acknowledge 
different points of view. At later stages, any kind of “cognitive dissonance” in Syria 
coverage has been dealt with by accusing opponents of one’s own views of acting in bad 
faith – and by maintaining heavily biased coverage for many years. For a second wave of 
resignations at Al Jazeera, see also Anne Sewell, “‘No independent journalism any more’ 
says ex-Al Jazeera reporter”, Digital Journal, 14 March 2012, 
http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/321163. (Accessed 30 August 2018). For “Russian” 
versus “Western” coverage of the same story, namely the resignation of journalist Ali 
Hashim and two others from Al Jazeera in Lebanon in March 2012, see Russia Today, 
“Ex-employee: Al Jazeera provided Syrian rebels with satphones”, 4 April 2012, 
https://www.rt.com/news/al-jazeera-rebels-phones-lebanon-281/. (Accessed 30 August 
2018), and Ali Hashem [alternative spelling of the same name], “The Arab spring has 
shaken Arab TV’s credibility”, Guardian [UK], 3 April 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2012/apr/03/arab-spring-arab-tv-credibility. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
43  Craig Whitlock, “U.S. secretly backed Syrian opposition groups, cables released by 
WikiLeaks show”, Washington Post, 17 April 2011. 
44  James Harkin, “Good media, bad politics? New media and the Syrian conflict”, Reuters 
Institute Fellowship Paper, University of Oxford, Michaelmas Term 2013, p. 12, 
http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/research/files/Good%2520media
%252C%2520bad%2520politics%2520New%2520media%2520and%2520the%2520Syri
an%2520conflict.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
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protests, who began to shoot at the police first. Very often the violence of the 
security forces has been a reaction to the brutal violence of the armed rebels”.45 
 During 2011 and until mid-2012, the situation was still far below the 
level of a full-scale war. The attacks on the army and the police force were 
mostly “hit-and-run” events and no Syrian localities other than parts of the city 
of Homs were under the control of insurgents. During this period, the US and 
other Western powers started to argue that the Assad government had lost all 
legitimacy and had to leave office. Throughout 2012, the Western media 
engaged in sustained efforts to write Assad out of office. It was argued that the 
Syrian army was breaking up along sectarian lines due to mass desertions of 
Sunni conscripts to the so-called “Free Syrian Army”, which was presented as 
being made up of deserters from the official army. It was also claimed that the 
Syrian government was about to collapse, due to the individual desertion of 
high profile individuals from the ranks of the Syrian leadership. (Altogether 
only three prominent individuals, namely a newly appointed Sunni Prime 
Minster, a government spokesman, and a one-star Syrian general who had once 
appeared in a photograph standing next to the Syrian President could be 
identified as regime deserters.) In July 2012, the front cover of the “Economist” 
weekly carried the announcement “Syria: Toward the endgame”. There were 
also efforts to find information to personally discredit the Syrian President and 
his wife. These efforts did not, however, produce convincing results. 
 During 2012, the security situation rapidly deteriorated. The 
fundamental reason for the escalation of the conflict was the delivery of 
weapons and the provision of monetary and logistical support for Syrian 
insurgents by outside state actors, namely the US, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey 
and Israel. From today’s point of view, one can state with confidence that the 
pattern of the arming of the insurgency was a primarily US-led operation 
funded by the Arab monarchies and logistically controlled from US-led 
operations rooms in Turkey and Jordan. In this context, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) covert action in Syria was code-named “Timber Sycamore”, 
referring to a tree plant that is mentioned in the Christian Bible.
46
 While exact 
figures about spending volumes and full details about arms deliveries are not 
                                               
45  John Rosenthal, “An Eyewitness to the Syrian Rebellion: Father Frans in His Own 
Words”, The BRICS Post, 19 April 2014, http://thebricspost.com/an-eyewitness-to-the-
syrian-rebellion-father-frans-in-his-own-words/#.WwuU9qSFNhG. (Accessed 30 August 
2018). 
46  In the context of the CIA operation, the following appears topical: “He destroyed their 
vines with hail and their sycamores with frost” (Psalm 78(47)), see 
https://www.bibleserver.com/text/ESV/Psalm78. The “Sycamore” (Ficus sycomorus) is 
commonly found in Egypt, Israel, Syria, Central and Eastern Africa and the southern part 
of the Arab peninsula, including Yemen, that all overlap with high levels of covert action 
by the CIA. 
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available, one must stress that the operation has been one of the largest ever 
conducted in the history of the CIA with a multi-billion dollar budget.
47
 
 The arming of the Syrian insurgency proceeded as follows: a major 
early push was the delivery by the CIA of weapons from Libyan depots after the 
fall of the Gadhafi regime in 2011 to Jordan and Turkey from where they were 
distributed to insurgents entering Syria or otherwise smuggled into the 
country.
48
 The general pattern of the delivery of weapons was that they were 
procured from third countries, namely a high share of weapons consisted of 
aged and sometime still Soviet-made weapons stocks from Eastern European 
                                               
47  Even a casual online search of US mainstream media outlets suggests that fragmented 
CIA, Pentagon and various US agencies’ spending for “train-and-equip” missions and 
parallel arms deliveries to Syrian insurgents amounted to multi-billion dollar spending, cf. 
Mark Mazzetti, Adam Goldman, Michael S. Schmidt, “Behind the Sudden Death of a $1 
Billion Secret C.I.A. War in Syria”, New York Times, 2 August 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-syria-rebel-arm-traintrump.html. 
(Accessed 30 August 2018). The same paper had earlier acknowledged Saudi funding of 
CIA operations “with no strings attached”, Mark Mazzetti, Matt Apuzzo, “U.S. Relies 
Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels”, New York Times, 23 January 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/w/orld/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudi-
money-to-support-syrian-rebels.html?_r=0.  (Accessed 30 August 2018). Other US 
sources suggest that the CIA’s Syria budget was “approaching $1 billion a year”, Greg 
Miller, Karen DeYoung, “Secret CIA effort in Syria faces large funding cut”, Washington 
Post, 12 June 2015. It adds to the Orwellian feel of the US media landscape that figures 
on spending are reported in the context of proclaimed “cuts” rather than during initial 
appropriations. Moreover, reporting of the “papers of record” was only conducted with a 
delay of three to five years and in reaction to alternative media reporting at the time of the 
initial CIA intervention into the Syrian war – from at least the beginning of 2012, but 
likely earlier, with large-scale arms deliveries to the insurgents. The reason for the US 
papers’ reporting on the CIA’s covert action in Syria was at least partially due to the 
clumsy manner in which the US government’s Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) 
website had solicited private shipping companies to deliver weapons and ammunition – 
subsequently “updated with a detailed packing list” – from Romania’s harbour of 
Constanta to the Jordanian harbour of Aqaba, see Jeremy Binnie, Neil Gibson, “Details of 
US arms shipment to Syrian rebels revealed”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 April 2016. In 
addition, the former US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford – himself a leading advocate of 
armed intervention in Syria – suggested that between 3 and 4 billion dollars were spend 
on US military operations in Syria between 2014 and 2017. Other spending concerned 
around one billion dollars for the last two years supporting “local security forces” and 875 
million dollars since 2012 for “non-lethal and stabilization aid to opposition-controlled 
areas” under the jurisdiction of USAID, see “Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee by Ambassador (Ret) Robert S. Ford”, February 6, 2018, 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20180206106832/ HHR G-115-FA13-
WstateFor  dR-20180206.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2018). Needless to say that these 
revelations still just cover the tip of the iceberg. 
48  C.J. Chivers, Eric Schmitt, “Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands, With Aid From 
C.I.A.”, New York Times, 24 March 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/ 
world/middleeast/arms-airlift-to-syrian-rebels-expands-with-cia-aid.html. (Accessed 30 
August 2018). 
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states, including EU member states.
49
 These weapons were purchased by 
intermediaries and delivered in civilian planes, sometimes by countries 
otherwise not known to be directly involved in the conflict, while other CIA-
guided weapons deliveries passed though US military bases in Germany and 
their final destination was wrongly claimed to be Arab allies of the US rather 
than the Syrian insurgents, as was really the case
50
. 
 In addition to obsolete weapons, the insurgents were also increasingly 
supplied with modern anti-tank weapons, which had a strong impact in terms of 
increasing the losses of the Syrian Army. Due to the steady stream of arms and 
funding, such as monthly salaries for fighters, the insurgents started to 
permanently hold territories in Syria. This development was symbolized by the 
capturing of the eastern sections of Syria’s largest city of Aleppo in the summer 
of 2012 by armed groups entering from Turkey. Most of the insurgent-captured 
territory was in the regions bordering Turkey and Jordan, underlining the extent 
to which the armed groups were supplied from the neighbouring countries.  
 In addition, the initially Iraq-based Nusra Front (Al Qaida) entered 
Syria and captured a corridor along the banks of the Euphrates River while 
Kurdish militias took over many northern areas of Syria. In 2013, the territories 
east of the Euphrates River increasingly fell under the control of the Nusra 
Front and the Kurds while the Syrian government presence in this region was 
reduced to some urban centres. In the first half of 2014 and especially since 
June 2014, nearly all of the Nusra-held territories were taken over by the so-
called Islamic state militias (referred to as ISIS or Daesh) in parallel with their 
capturing of territories in neighbouring Iraq. During this period, Western 
observers started to argue that ISIS would constitute a major security threat for 
many years to come. 
 In the meantime, the Syrian government increasingly relied on support 
from the Lebanese Hezbollah, which entered Syria on a larger scale in the 
summer of 2013. Around the same time, Iran also sent advisors at the invitation 
of the Syrian government. On the side of the insurgents, the number of Islamist 
fighters from outside of Syria quickly grew with large numbers originating from 
countries such as Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, and such regions as Russia’s 
Chechnya province. Thus, the conflict increasingly turned into a transnational 
war in Syria rather than a “civil war” between Syrians. In September 2014, the 
                                               
49  Lawrence Marzouk, Ivan Angelovski, Miranda Patrucic, “Making a Killing: The 1.2 
Billion Euro Arms Pipeline to Middle East’, Balkan Arms Trade Investigative Network, 
27 July 2016”, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/making-a-killing-the-1-2-billion-
euros-arms-pipeline-to-middle-east-07-26-2016. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
50  Ivan Angelovski, Lawrence Marzouk, “The Pentagon’s $2.2 Billion Soviet Arms Pipeline 
Flooding Syria”, Balkan Arms Trade Investigative Network, 12 September 2017, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/the-pentagon-s-2-2-billion-soviet-arms-pipeline-
flooding-syria-09-12-2017. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
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US started air strikes in Syria that were claimed to exclusively target ISIS. From 
October 2015, the US acknowledged the presence of US ground troops in north 
Syria that became embedded with the Kurdish YPG militia. According to the 
Syrian government, US air strikes against ISIS were mostly symbolical and 
served to disguise the covert cooperation between local US allies such as 
Turkey and ISIS militants. 
 A major development in terms of the struggle for public opinion was 
the US government’s allegation against the Syrian government to be guilty of 
the repeated usage of chemical weapons. The Syrian government firmly rejected 
such claims holding that it had decommissioned all its chemical weapons stocks 
in line with agreements brokered by Russia and agreed with the US in 
September 2013. This decommissioning of chemical weapons followed US 
President Obama’s remark, in August 2012, that he considered the use of 
chemical weapons a “red line” that “would change [his] calculus 
significantly”.51 Since 2013, the Syrian government has nevertheless been 
accused by Western countries and Syrian insurgents to have hidden chemical 
weapons stocks and subsequently used them against civilians. The Syrian 
government has alleged that chemical weapons were in fact used by insurgents 
who had either produced them locally (chlorine gas is easy to manufacture), or 
had been supplied to the insurgents by foreign governments and in particular by 
Saudi and Turkish intelligence agencies. For the general public, it is impossible 
to evaluate such claims and chemical weapons “experts” have been divided in 
their evaluation of events.
52
 
  One should keep in mind, however, that most of these communicative 
efforts originated with US, UK and other Western state-funded public relations 
operations, namely the “White Helmets” and the “Syrian Observatory for 
Human Rights”.53 These two groups (in the latter case, a single person living in 
                                               
51  Barack H. Obama, “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps”, 20 
August 2012, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-
president-white-house-press-corps. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
52 Dennis J. Bernstein, “Weapons Inspector Refutes U.S. Syria Chemical Claim”, 
Consortiumnews, 27 April 2018, https://consortiumnews.com/2018/04/27/weapons-
inspector-refutes-u-s-syria-chemical-claims/. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
53  Scott Ritter, “The ‘White Helmets’ and the Inherent Contradiction of America’s Syria 
Policy”, truthdig, 5 October 2016, https://www.truthdig.com/articles/the-white-helmets-
and-the-inherent-contradiction-of-americas-syria-policy/. (Accessed 30 August 2018). For 
UK Foreign Office funding of the “Syrian Observatory for Human Rights”, see Peter 
Hitchens, 13 May 2018, http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2018/05/what-moral-
standing-do-we-have-after-this-outrage-and-are-we-about-to-join-another-idiotic-war-
like-.html.As Hitchenssarcastically remarks, the acknowledgement of providing 
194,769,60 British Pounds for “communications equipment and cameras” in 2012 shows 
“precision”. One must acknowledge that the amount is rather modest in comparison to 
other Western funding streams facilitating “strategic communication” on Syria. At the 
same time, Western (and other) governments have not been able to find sufficient funds 
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Coventry, UK) have acted as discursive gatekeepers by misleadingly presenting 
themselves as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) informing the Western 
publics in a neutral manner. In fact, they are Western government-funded – 
almost exclusively so in the case of the “White Helmets”, founded in 2013 by a 
former British army officer and receiving funding from various US, UK, Dutch, 
German, Danish and Japanese government bodies, according to the relevant 
Wikipedia entry – in order to produce a “concert of voices” and discursive 
power, at least within the boundaries of the Western media system.  
 The main function of the White Helmets has been to supply “video 
evidence” for “chemical weapons attacks” blamed on the Syrian government. 
The organisation has exclusively operated in Syrian territories held by the 
insurgents. It is acknowledged that “volunteers” of the organisation are paid 
monthly stipends and that some of the “activists” are former fighters. On 23 
July 2018, around 400 of the “White Helmets” were evacuated from south-
eastern Syria by being allowed to transfer into the Israel-occupied Syrian Golan 
from where they travelled under the armed guard of Israeli soldiers to Jordan 
where they are according to Western media reports expected to be offered 
asylum in Western countries that have sponsored their activities. 
 Summing up the struggle for public opinion, one might point to a 
“White Rabbit” effect, namely the attention of the public is managed in the 
same manner in which magicians distract their audience to pay attention to red 
herrings. Rather than to ask basic questions about the legality of the US-led 
arming of the Syrian insurgency, which is in breach of section 2.4 of the U.N. 
Charter stating that states must “refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state”, global public opinion is subjected to a regular supply of allegations 
against the Syrian government. These allegations are too complex, too 
numerous and too frequent to be evaluated in any meaningful manner by the 
general public. 
 Such illiberal and misleading communicative practices are in turn 
required in order to present Syria as a “non-state”, namely as a political entity 
that has lost all legitimacy in the international system and can be attacked at 
will. Ultimately, however, any kind of public relations effort produces 
diminishing returns over time. After some time, most people make up their 
mind about whether or not they trust the Western media claims. The majority 
will in any case chose the default option of not paying any further attention. In 
fact, global publics have largely stopped to monitor Syrian events due to the 
                                                                                                                   
for genuine humanitarian assistance to Syrians. According to Mark Lowcock, the U.N. 
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, the “UN appeal for Syria this year 
remains substantially underfunded”, “Briefing to the Security Council (…), New York, 27 
July 2018”, p. 4, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/180726_Syria_ 
USG%20SECCO%20statement-Final-1.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
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long-term oversupply of contesting narratives that failed to deliver genuine 
insights and instead have put a large question mark behind the role of those 
maintaining and managing the traditional media system.
54
 
 Returning to the military conflict, the fighting in 2014 and 2015 was 
mostly dominated by the military offensive of ISIS and resulted in the large-
scale withdrawal of the Syrian army from the countryside to avoid an 
overextended frontline. As a result of this tactical withdrawal, the territory 
controlled by the Syrian government became limited to a north-south corridor in 
the western parts of the country and some urban centres elsewhere; namely 
government troops defended the ISIS-surrounded cities of Hasakah and Deir ez-
Zor for more than three years. Significantly, most major Syrian cities, with the 
exception of the eastern part of Aleppo, Idlib, Raqqa and some smaller cities in 
the Kurdish-dominated northern parts of the country, remained under the 
control of the government. Before the Russian military intervention in 
September 2015, the battle nevertheless appeared to turn against the Syrian 
military often relying on obsolete military supplies – before the war, the Syrian 
defence budget had only been around one per cent of overall Middle Eastern 
military spending. 
 Following on the Russian military intervention, amounting to Russian 
air force attacks against the Islamist groups, provision of military advisors and 
resupply of the Syrian army, the military situation slowly started to shift in the 
Syrian government’s favour. The most significant element of the Russian 
intervention was the improved air strike capability which allowed destroying 
tunnel systems and bunkers that the insurgents had constructed beneath urban 
spaces and that the Syrian air force had been unable to attack.  
 In mid-2016, it became known that the French-Swiss company Lafarge 
had continued to run its cement factory located near the Syrian city of Jalabiya 
(150 kilometres east of Aleppo in north Syria) when the region was occupied by 
ISIS and other Islamist insurgents. The cement factory in question, which 
constituted the largest foreign investment in Syria outside of the oil sector when 
it was initially acquired in 2007, produced the materials that were used by 
insurgents to construct fortifications. In fact, the very high production volume 
of the plant suggested a war-enabling function, since the concrete fortifications 
increased the ability of the insurgents to withstand bombardments and artillery 
fire by the Syrian army. The overall effect was in all likelihood the extension of 
the war. In 2017, the company also acknowledged that it had paid monies to 
                                               
54  Wolf Reiser, “Freiwild. Über Zähmung, Verwahrlosung und Niedergang des 
Journalismus”, Lettre International, 107, Winter 2014, http://wolf-reiser.de/leseproben-
wolf-reiser-autor/pdfe-wolf-reiser-autor/Lettre_Freiwild.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2018); 
Daniel Falcone, “A Reporter’s Reporter: a Conversation with Seymour Hersh”, 
Counterpunch, 25 June 2018, https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/06/25/a-reporters-
reporter-a-conversation-with-seymour-hersh/. (Accessed 30 August 2018).  
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ISIS, Al Nusra and Kurdish militias and purchased oil from ISIS in order to run 
its cement factory.
55
 In turn, it became known that the French government had 
earlier asked the US government not to bomb the plant, which from the French 
point of view amounted to a strategic regional investment.
56
 
 The major military turning point of the Syrian war was the retaking of the 
eastern part of Aleppo by the Syrian army in December 2016. Since then, the 
Syrian army has increasingly gained the upper hand and has restored full control of 
the surroundings of the national capital of Damascus. In mid-2018, the territories of 
Syria that are still held by insurgents are visibly depending on supplies from 
neighbouring countries and are isolated from the rest of the country. 
 To sum up, the arrival of Russia as a direct military actor completed the 
transformation of the Syrian conflict into a de facto global war over world 
order. Over time, this war has acquired the characteristics of a three-level 
conflict (local, regional and global), which is fought in different theatres, 
namely as ground, air and media communications war. Once the US and Russia 
entered the conflict directly, the regional US proxy powers – Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar and Turkey – started to disagree among themselves about how to proceed. 
This triggered a decline in numbers and strength of Islamist groups fighting on 
the ground, since their funding, leadership and logistics became more difficult. 
By comparison, Iran as the long-standing geopolitical ally of the Syrian state 
remained willing to extend support to the Syrian government to keep potential 
opponents busy in a safe distance from its own territory. Moreover, Russia and 
Iran succeeded to some extent in separating Turkey from its former Sunni Arab 
allies – by skilfully stressing their joint opposition to a Kurdish state in the 
region that could potentially question Turkey’s territorial integrity. 
 In August 2018, Syria has been divided up by different forces into 
zones of interest. Most of the Syrian territory has been retaken by the Syrian 
army. There are, however, three occupied zones in Syria. These are in order of 
significance first the territories east of the Euphrates River that are currently 
under the joint control of Kurdish militias (YPG) and US and French troops. 
The latter two powers have made continuous efforts to strengthen their military 
fortifications in this part of the country which contains fertile agricultural land 
and 90 per cent of Syria’s oil production facilities. A second north-western zone 
around Idlib is the last larger region still controlled by Islamist groups. As part 
of local ceasefire and de-escalation agreements elsewhere, Islamist fighters 
                                               
55  Léonard Faytre, “Lafarge’s Cooperation with Terrorist Organizations in Syria: A State 
Scandal?”, SETA Perspective, 36, April 2018, https://setav.org/en/assets/uploads/ 
2018/04/36 _Perspective_Lafarge.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
56  Emmanuel Jarry, “Exclusive: France asked U.S. not to bomb Lafarge factory in Syria in 
2014 – emails”, reuters.com, 26 April 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
lafargeholcim-syria-france-exclusive/exclusive-france-asked-u-s-not-to-bomb-lafarge-
factory-in-syria-in-2014-emails-idUSKBN1HW2DE. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
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from other parts of the country, most recently from the southern city of Dara, 
have been transported to Idlib where they now frequently fight each other. In 
addition, Russia, Iran and Turkey, as sponsoring powers of the Russia-led 
Astana process that is supposed to bring the Syrian government and opposition 
to the negotiating table, have each constructed “observation points” in the 
vicinity of the Idlib zone. These underline their joint effort to police the region 
and to re-open transport routes that are currently closed due to the presence of 
the Islamist groups. A third sector further north around the Syrian city of Afrin 
has been occupied by the Turkish army since February 2018. 
 Throughout the first half of 2018, it remained unclear whether the war 
would soon end or, alternatively, would further escalate. Regarding the first 
scenario, one might argue that the war could end in the sense that all involved 
parties currently claim victory in one way or another. This rather unusual 
condition after seven years of fighting derives from the fact that all involved 
actors have achieved something. The Syrian government has restored its control 
of most regions of the country. At least five other countries have intervened 
from outside with ground troops and have not been defeated in military terms, 
namely Russia, Iran, Turkey, the US and France. Finally, Israel has managed to 
“normalize” its incursions into Syrian airspace and has attacked targets in Syria 
with impunity. In this sense, there are only winners, except the Syrian people. 
 On the other hand, many observers were predicting further escalation 
arguing that the sunk investment of the countries occupying territory in Syria, 
namely Turkey, the US and France, suggest unwillingness on their part to hand 
back what they captured. Moreover, these states are all able to further escalate 
the conflict. At times, some actors appear desperate to make the conflict flame 
up again. The suggestion of US President Trump to ask for Saudi troops to 
replace the US forces east of the Euphrates River certainly appeared highly 
inappropriate in the sense of offending everybody in the region, while his 
alternative suggestion for Saudi Arabia to instead fund the US occupation in 
Syria was difficult to grasp logically.
57
 Nevertheless, such behaviour certainly 
helped to remind Kurdish militias of the precariousness of their regional 
position. 
 After so far considering the revealed preferences of the states involved 
in the Syrian war, the fourth section now turns to the theoretical approach of 
“peripheral realism” that was first advanced by the Argentinian political 
scientist Carlos Escudé. It will be argued that certain components of this theory 
are helpful in analysing the Syrian case. 
 
                                               
57  Hummam Sheikh Ali, “News Analysis: Arab forces to replace Americans in Syria 
‘unrealistic”’, xinhuanet, 30 April 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
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Explaining The Syrian Conflict: Peripheral Realism Theory 
 
 This section examines the theoretical approach of peripheral realism 
(subsequently referred to as PR) in order to address the question of whether or 
not a new balance of power is likely to emerge in the Middle East region. After 
a brief introduction considering other theoretical approaches, this section 
highlights how PR can add insights regarding the issue of state hierarchy in the 
Arab world that are relevant to explain the Syrian case. 
 Before turning to these theories, one might start by highlighting that 
some long-standing and promising theoretical approaches with regard to Syria 
ultimately failed to be applicable to the post-2011 situation. For example, the 
earlier prominent focus on domestic economic issues and the state executive’s 
management of rent income from oil and gas revenue, namely theories focusing 
on the “rentier state” and the “state class”, placed the focus on issues of 
domestic political bargaining and social class cleavages.
58
 In fact, the condition 
of war soon began to challenge the very survival of the Syrian state and society. 
Due to these exceptionally grave circumstances, the political economy 
dimension turned out to be less significant than had been previously expected. 
The Syrian state received economic and military assistance from Iran, Russia, 
and, less prominently, from China and elsewhere. This proved to be sufficient in 
the sense of maintaining the Syrian state and the army’s war effort while also 
offering some basic subsistence provisions for people in government-held parts 
of the country. A significant share of the population left the country for 
neighbouring countries and later for places elsewhere. Crucially, this 
unprecedented economic decline could not be blamed on Syrian state executives 
but was directly due to the military conflict. 
 The costs of war were imposed in a highly asymmetrical manner. The 
highest costs were carried by Syrian citizens, the Syrian army, the Lebanese 
Hezbollah movement and, less directly, by Iran. For the supporters of the “Axis 
of Resistance”, the conflict became a matter of (political) survival, while the 
external supporters of the Islamist insurgents had only limited stakes in the 
conflict since their own survival was not on the line.
59
 In this context, US 
policy-makers were in a position to “lead from behind” by drip-feeding 
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weapons to the insurgents at a much lower political cost in comparison to the 
earlier direct attack on and occupation of Iraq in 2003. It should be noted that 
this style of US war-making was similar to the US support for Islamists in 
Afghanistan before and after the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the assistance for 
the contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s.
60
 However, one crucial difference is that 
Syria had already, since the mid-1950s, belonged to the Soviet (and later 
Russian) zone of geopolitical influence in the Middle East. To put it differently, 
President Obama’s declaration of March 2014 calling Russia a “regional 
power” must be understood as a provocative statement of intent. He thereby 
signalled that he did not accept the pre-existing alignments in the Middle East.
61
 
 In the end, state and society in Syria had no choice but to resist against 
the Islamist insurgents regardless of the costs: there was never any credible 
political alternative inside the country that could have offered another way out 
from the current predicament. Moreover, the extremist Islamist groups proved 
in their own conquered zones of sectarian control that a society under their rule 
was a place that had nothing in common with the multi-ethnic and multi-
religious traditions of Syrian society. From the point of view of the Western 
powers, the expected outcome of the conflict for Syria is to lose its relative 
autonomy in the region – by denying the current leadership access to its own 
resources and territory. In addition, the Syrian population is targeted with 
sanctions in line with the earlier Iraqi example. This “strategy” is maintained 
mostly because the costs for the Western powers to do so are rather low. 
 Turning now to theoretical perspectives on the Syrian conflict since 
2011, the approach of peripheral realism appears most topical. The PR approach 
broadly belongs to realist international relations (IR) theory, but also includes 
insights from dependency theory and other structuralist approaches to world 
order. Crucially, PR rejects the mainstream realist concept of “anarchy” in the 
relationship between states and focuses instead on status hierarchy, which is 
considered to act as a source of relative stability in the relationships between 
states. In this context, PR suggests that the global state system falls into three 
groups: (1) rule makers; (2) rule takers; and (3) rebel states. In accordance with 
this classification and in line with other versions of realism, it is further 
suggested that “the interstate order can never be democratic or egalitarian…. 
[T]he world order is of necessity hierarchical”.62 Contrary to many other realist 
approaches, however, PR stresses the need to focus on detailed analysis of 
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individual states and of domestic factors to explain their relative position in the 
hierarchical international system.  
 Moreover, PR also includes normative elements suggesting that state 
executives of weaker states should prioritise economic development while 
avoiding unnecessary confrontations with rule-making states. By advancing 
economically, a steady gain in (relative) autonomy of weaker states in their 
relationship with rule makers and an improved position in comparison with their 
peers is expected. In this context, “the sacrifice of the interests, welfare, and 
even the lives of multitudes of poor people to the vanity of their elite” is 
criticized, which is particularly the case when “reason and cost-benefit analysis 
are replaced by emotions”.63 Nevertheless, this normative element in the theory, 
namely that state executives should not attempt to “reach a level of autonomy 
that their people cannot bear”,64 is in turn subjected to three qualifications.  
 First, the theory is “realist” in the sense that it freely acknowledges that 
rule-making states will not necessarily follow their own rules, but will ignore 
the rules or invent new ones when it suits their purposes. This tendency will be 
most pronounced under conditions of unipolarity, which enables the hegemon to 
break rules at very low cost. Second, and directly related to the first point, the 
executives of weaker states are advised to manage state business in a discrete 
manner. On the one hand, it is suggested that they should signal their 
acceptance of the hegemon’s authority. On the other hand, it is acknowledged 
that occasional efforts at political activism in attempts to extract concessions 
from stronger states – namely efforts to play them against each other – is a 
legitimate tactic on the part of weaker actors in the international system. Third, 
the theory also accepts the fact that weaker states’ efforts at “good behaviour” 
to keep up cordial relations with rule makers will not necessarily guarantee 
safety from punishment by the hegemon. 
 In addition, the PR approach suggests a number or behavioural rules for 
state executives from weaker states to improve their standing. The general 
advice is to prioritise economic development, and states such as West Germany 
and Japan during the Cold War are in this regard singled out for praise. 
According to Escudé, these two countries’ willingness to focus on economic 
development while following the US rule maker on strategic issues resulted in 
their upward mobility in the international state hierarchy. However, the PR 
approach fails to clarify the exact relationship between economic and rule-
making power. In particular, it remains unclear whether or not Germany and 
Japan actually enjoy any significant degrees of strategic autonomy in the 
international system – both during and after the Cold War. In fact, PR offers 
                                               
63  Ibidem, p. 48, p. 50. 
64  Luis Schenoni, Carlos Escudé (2016) “Peripheral Realism Revisited”, Revista Brasileira 
de Politica Internacional, vol. 59, no. 1, 2016, pp. 1-18/ p. 8. 
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rather contradictory observations in this regard. It is acknowledged, for 
example, that “Europe remains a partially occupied continent…. European 
states have resigned sovereignty to the US because not doing so would have led 
to greater citizen costs, straining governability…. These states have not wanted 
to pay the costs of ‘full sovereignty’…”.65 One must conclude that these 
ambivalent remarks are a weak point of the PR approach! 
 On the other hand, PR is very clear about its main concern regarding 
weaker states, namely for their state executives to avoid picking unnecessary 
fights with the hegemon. The “sterile political rebellion against the written and 
unwritten rules of the world order”66 is repeatedly singled out for criticism, 
namely the decision of Argentina’s leaders to fight a war over the 
Malvinas/Falklands in 1982 is quoted as a bad example in this respect. The 
reason for this warning is that PR fundamentally accepts that state executives of 
weaker states do have significant degrees of autonomy in determining their own 
strategy. This applies according to PR at least to “middle-sized states” (Brazil, 
Mexico and Venezuela are quoted as examples to which one might add Syria, 
although at the lower end of the scale).  
 In conceptual terms, PR assumes that states primarily acquire power 
due to economic factors. They are then free to engage in “investments of 
autonomy”, namely further efforts at economic development, or, alternatively, 
are also free to “exhibit and spent” in efforts to challenge rule makers, which is 
referred to as the “consumption of autonomy” and might turn out to be very 
costly indeed.
67
 Escudé illustrates this point referencing the experience of his 
native country of Argentina, which was sanctioned by the US during and after 
WW2 due to its insistence on neutrality and a “third position” ideology during 
the Cold War. At a later point, Argentina was again sanctioned because of the 
decision to engage in the development of missile technology, jointly with 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (the Condor II project), which, according to Escudé, 
would have changed the strategic equilibrium in the Middle East.
68
 In summary, 
“[w]hat should be avoided are symbolic political confrontations, in order to 
better negotiate tangible economic interests in which the people’s well-being is 
at stake”.69 
 So far, so good. Yet the PR approach ultimately suffers from its 
ambivalent and unclear advice to citizens and leaders of peripheral states. To 
highlight just the most prominent examples: who is to define “reasonable” 
behaviour on the part of the executive of peripheral states? When exactly do 
peripheral states engage in “symbolic political confrontations”? At what point 
                                               
65  Escudé, “Realism”…cit. (footnote 62), p. 46. 
66  Ibidem, p. 48. 
67  Ibidem, p. 52. 
68  Ibidem, p. 54. 
69  Ibidem, p. 55. 
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do they have no other choice but to fight for “essential interests”? What options 
are available to peripheral states if the rule-making state is not benevolent but 
tyrannical? In this context, one must certainly question whether the examples of 
West Germany and Japan during the Cold War are really appropriate role 
models for today’s peripheral states. Thus, the suggestion that peripheral 
countries should serve their own best interest in maintaining good relations with 
regional or global hegemons “so long as this does not entail sacrificing its own 
material interests, which are paramount”70 fails to clarify how weaker states can 
arrive at appropriate decision-making. 
 To turn to the Syrian case, one must certainly discuss whether or not the 
country’s leadership could or should have behaved differently before or after 
2011. Yet throughout the country’s post-colonial history, practically all Syrian 
leaderships had to face the fact that the global hegemon, the US, and its regional 
main client, Israel (since the 1960s), have excluded the country from access to 
economic resources and political recognition. Moreover, Syria has suffered the 
occupation of some of its national territory by Israel (the Syrian Golan) and 
frequently had to bear costs due to US and Israeli wars in the region (e.g. 
Palestinian and Iraqi refugees fleeing to Syria). Did Syrian leaderships pick 
“unnecessary” fights with the US and its regional clients? The answer to this 
question of course depends on the attitude of the analyst. From the point of view 
of the current author, Syria’s leadership generally avoided such actions. In fact, 
Syria sometimes “bandwagoned” with the US on secondary questions in order 
to avoid unnecessary conflict escalation.  
 To begin with, Hafiz al-Assad did aspire to “strategic parity” with 
Israel. Yet this was an abstract pan-Arab aspiration for which Syria always 
lacked the necessary material resources. Once Egypt left the Arab line-up in the 
late 1970s, Syria settled for efforts at asymmetric balancing which turned since 
the 1980s into the “strategic” alliance with Hezbollah and Iran. Syria repeatedly 
made efforts to avoid “symbolical political confrontations”. Namely, the Syrian 
military intervention during the Lebanese civil war was conducted after 
consultation with the Western powers and their regional clients. During the US 
war to force Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, Syria again bandwagoned with the US. 
After September 11, 2001, Syria again cooperated with the US in the latter’s so-
called “war on terror”. During the presidency of Bashar al-Assad and until the 
beginning of the conflict in 2011, Syria repeatedly tried to negotiate with Israel 
about the return of the occupied Syrian Golan. The country also suggested 
regional disarmament, such as the 2003 Syrian initiative to decommission all 
Middle Eastern chemical weapons. Needless to say that these initiatives were all 
ignored by Israel, which enjoyed almost unconditional US backing before and 
after the end of the Cold War. 
                                               
70  Ibidem, emphasis in the original, additional reference omitted. 
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 This still leaves the question whether or not the Syrian state executive 
could have acted differently in negotiations with other Western and regional 
powers over oil and gas pipelines, the EU Association Agreement or similar 
issues in the first decade of the 21
st
 century. To be clear, offering Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia access to Syria to construct a gas pipeline could have conceivably 
purchased the support of these countries and could also have improved the 
relationship with the US. However, such change of course would have meant to 
abandon the previous alliances with Hezbollah, Iran and Russia that were tried 
and tested over decades. From the point of view of Syrian state executives, this 
was not an attractive offer – especially as it would have triggered further demands 
on Syria and would have left the country at the mercy of its new “friends”. 
 Perhaps some US policy-makers really perceived Syria as a potential 
second 1970s Egypt and Bashar as another Sadat. Yet the differences are just 
too dramatic to ignore: Sadat’s switch of allegiance was purchased by Israel’s 
return of the occupied Sinai and subsequent US economic and military 
patronage of the Egyptian state and military. Yet Israel was of course never 
willing to return the occupied Syrian Golan where highly promising oil and gas 
resources are located. Moreover, the US and Israel conducted a number of 
regional wars in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War. Thus it 
certainly appeared unsafe from the viewpoint of the Syrian government to 
voluntarily enter such highly asymmetric relationship. Finally, Russia’s and 
Iran’s geopolitical interests would also have been negatively affected. 
 Some might argue that the unconditional surrender to Western 
demands, namely to hand over the country to US-controlled clients, would have 
been a preferable alternative to the unprecedented devastation that the global 
war on Syria has triggered since 2011. However, the answer to this question 
cannot be found in the PR or any other theoretical approach. This question will 
be answered by current and future generations of Syrians. 
 Finally, the strongest single analytical feature of PR theory is how it 
clarifies the relative standing of states in a hierarchical regional or international 
system. In this respect, the starting point of PR classification of state power is 
classical realist and reductionist: states are primarily classified according to 
their “hard” power potential, which is in turn based on analysis of their strongly 
correlated economic and military capabilities. According to PR, states divide 
into four status groups: (1) global hegemon (under unipolarity) or multiple great 
powers (under multipolarity), primarily defined by their command of world 
destroying nuclear military capabilities; (2) class A rule-takers, defined as 
highly industrialised states that are fully integrated into the world economy but 
lack world destroying military capabilities; (3) class B rule-takers, defined as 
developing countries that are capable of providing for their own security vis-à-
vis other rule-taking neighbouring peripheral states; (4) class C rule-taking 
states, defined as peripheral states that cannot defend themselves vis-à-vis class 
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B peripheral neighbouring states and “survive as formally independent because 
of interstate consensuses to that effect”.71 
 In order to apply this general classification scheme to the Middle East 
region (defined for the purpose of this article as the Levant/Arab peninsula 
states, Turkey, Iran and additionally considering the US and Russia as 
prominent external actors), one must conduct some analytical adjustments. This 
is explicitly recommended by PR authors holding that “[o]ther case studies will 
warrant the coinage of other subcategories”.72 The following analytical 
adjustments are required: (1) the rule-making hegemon category is subdivided 
into a global hegemon (the US) and a number of other rule-making states that 
command world-destroying military potential and have a long-term track record 
of successfully defending their national territory (at least seven states); (2) the 
category of class A, B and C rule-takers is extended to also include rebel states, 
since some Middle East countries have frequently resisted US hegemony in one 
context and bandwagoned with the US in other contexts; (3) a new analytical 
category termed “state ruins/state by name only” is added to refer to Yemen as a 
regional “failed state”. Once these analytical adjustments are made, one can 
classify the Middle East state system along the lines shown in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Hierarchy of rule-making and rule-taking states in the global and Middle 
Eastern state systems 
Characteristics of statehood Global system Middle East 
Hegemon USA USA 
Other rule-making and/or rule-defying 
states with world-destroying capabilities 
Russia, China, Israel*, 
UK, France, Pakistan*, 
India* 
Russia, Israel, UK, 
France, China 
Class A rule-takers (highly 
industrialized without world-destroying 
capabilities) 
Germany, Japan, most 
other OECD states 
None 
Class B rule-takers and rebel states (able to 
provide for their security vis-à-vis other 
rule-taking peripheral neighbours) 
cf. Brazil 
Turkey, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Iraq, 
UAE 
Class C rule-takers (unable to defend 
themselves vis-à-vis class B states) 
cf. Argentina 
Jordan, Lebanon, 
Qatar, Oman 
State ruins/state by name only Numerous Yemen 
* Non-signature states of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Source: Luis Schenoni, Carlos Escudé, “Peripheral Realism…”, cit., p. 8; Jörg Michael Dostal, 
“Transnational war…”, cit. 
                                               
71  Luis Schenoni, Carlos Escudé (2016) “Peripheral Realism…”, cit., p. 8. 
72  Ibidem. 
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 The purpose of this classification exercise is to arrive at a more exact 
explanation of the political function of the Syrian war for maintaining the US-
dominated regional state hierarchy. At the local level, the US goal is to push 
down Syria’s status from a category B state to a category C state or even a 
“state ruin”; at the regional level, the strategic objective is to keep all other Arab 
states, Iran and Turkey safely away from reaching category A status by 
diverting their economic potential toward warfare rather than the construction 
of additional economic capabilities and, directly related, another major purpose 
is to maintain Israel’s privileged position as the only regional power with 
world-destroying capabilities; finally, at the global level, the Syrian war is 
expected to sustain the US regional leadership role as outlined in the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, thereby also locking in the dollar-denominated trade in 
oil and expanding US-provided arms sales to the regional client states. The 
preferential US treatment of Israel as the only permanent – since the 1960s – 
regional deputy of the global hegemon tightly links the regional and global 
levels. In addition, the conflict concerns the great power competition, namely 
US efforts to minimize the regional role of other great powers (Russia, China) 
and, secondary, aims to split the EU states by offering the UK, France and 
perhaps some other EU countries minor roles in the US policing of the region. 
 In order to clarify further how state hierarchy in the Middle East has 
worked after formal decolonization, one might first highlight Israel’s role. The 
country emerged in 1948 initially under French military and US economic 
patronage. Already during the 1950s, the country enjoyed privileged military 
support from France and the UK in comparison to the Arab states and, since the 
1960s during the Johnson presidency, became the privileged US client in the 
region. Ever since, Israel enjoyed economic and military support from the US 
that is qualitatively/technologically above what any other state in the region can 
possibly receive from US sources. 
 This US commitment to privilege Israel can be quantified to some 
extent by looking at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) annual statistics on arms exports to the Middle East. However, even the 
SIPRI figures as the best available long-term data set severely understate the 
degree of US economic and military support for reasons such as free provision 
of weapons for Israel (i.e. not visible in statistics), sharing of technology with 
Israel (officially and by accepting Israeli “technology transfer” from the US), 
permission for Israel to sell advanced US and domestically re-engineered 
weapons outside the Middle East which strengthens Israel’s economic status. In 
addition, Israel has constructed its own military-industrial complex adding to its 
autonomy. It possesses a full set of weapons of mass destruction (biological, 
chemical, nuclear) and has not joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or 
any other arms control regime. Its nuclear arsenal is substantial and its missile 
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technology allows for global delivery of such weapons by means of nuclear-
armed submarines.
73
 
 Crucially, the US guarantees Israel that all other states in the region – 
independent from their political posture – are denied military supplies that 
would allow them to compete with Israel. Thus, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
states have practically no domestic defence industries and no relevant 
technological capabilities. Instead, these countries are strongly encouraged to 
purchase US military supplies. However, these deliveries are technology-wise 
less advanced when compared to the parallel supplies for Israel.
74
 Although the 
US has frequently expanded the volume of military supplies – the US under 
Obama and Trump vastly expanded arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
States, as did the UK and France – these have been less advanced technology-
wise when compared to the Israeli arsenal which maintains a “qualitative 
military edge”.75 
 In terms of Middle East state hierarchy, this suggests the existence of 
three categories of countries among the class B rule-takers outlined in Table 2. 
The first category consists of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are very likely 
going to remain locked into the class B rule-taker category. This is due to the 
following factors: (1) their industrial sector is narrow in scope and mostly 
focused on resource extraction; (2) their domestic arms manufacturing is 
negligible; (3) the share of the population employed in technology-rich 
industrial employment is low; (4) the armed forces of these countries all heavily 
depend on Western contractors in order to use their imported defence 
technologies which allows sales countries informal control of the local 
arsenals;
76
 (5) the political leadership structure of tribal and clan-based 
patrimonialism is dysfunctional due to the numerical size of the ruling families 
and parallel conflict over access to state funds.
77
 The new Saudi leadership has 
recently announced its aspiration to have “half of Saudi [arms] procurement 
                                               
73  In addition to the SIPRI data, see for information about Israeli and other Middle Eastern 
states’ military capabilities the relevant entries on national defense industries available at 
globalsecurity.org. 
74  Little, American Orientalism…cit., p. 148. 
75  Mark Mazzetti, Helene Cooper, “Sale of U.S. Arms Fuels the Wars of Arab States”, New 
York Times, 18 April 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/world/middleeast/sale-
of-us-arms-fuels-the-wars-of-arab-states.html (accessed 30 August 2018); Pieter D. 
Wezeman, “II. Arms transfers to the Middle East and North Africa, and the military 
intervention in Yemen”, SIPRI Yearbook 2016, Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 587-94. 
76  Mike Lewis, Katherine Templar, “UK Personnel Supporting the Saudi Armed Forces – 
Risk, Knowledge and Accountability”, mikelewisresearch.com, 2018, https://www.mikelewi 
sresearch.com/RSAFfinal.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
77  Wolfgang Kemp, Der Scheich, zu Klampen Verlag, Springe am Deister, 2018, pp. 19-26. 
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done locally by 2030”.78 Yet this ambitious plan is very likely to fail if one 
looks at the past historical track record – no matter how close the Saudi leaders 
move toward Israel. 
 The second category of class B rule-takers is made up of Turkey and 
Iran. In spite of their much lower GDP per capita in comparison to the Gulf 
monarchies, these two countries are from a structural perspective – the 
analytical perspective recommended by PR – significantly more advanced. In 
particular, they possess: (1) a much more balanced industrial sector which 
includes capabilities unrelated to resource extraction; (2) a domestic defence-
industrial base; (3) the share of the population employed in industry is 
significantly higher in comparison with the Gulf states; (4) the armed forces are 
to some extent (Turkey) or to a large extent (Iran) equipped with domestically-
made military supplies. Considering the larger picture, Turkey and Iran are 
clearly the technologically most advanced Muslim countries in the region. They 
could likely reach the status of class A rule-taking states, namely to become 
advanced industrial societies with a high degree of integration into the global 
economy. At present, Turkey is closest to this status while Iran would perhaps reach 
this position even earlier in the absence of US-imposed economic sanctions. 
 In turn, Syria and Iraq make up a third group that could be described as 
struggling class B states. Both countries have for many years been engaged in 
efforts to resist occupation by regional or global powers. They have partially 
succeeded in this respect in the sense of the nominal withdrawal of US troops 
from Iraq in 2011. However, US troops have since returned – officially 
acknowledged are 5200 soldiers in Iraq and “around 2000” in Syria – to 
“support the struggle against ISIS”. The US has since, in February 2018, called 
on other NATO countries to send troops to Iraq to engage in bigger “train-and-
advise” missions with the Iraqi military.79 In the meantime, the large-scale 
defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq and the prevention of Kurdish separation in the 
case of Iraq have removed the pretext for the presence of foreign troops – 
strengthening the hands of Syrian and Iraqi policy-makers. Moreover, the 
relatively small number of occupying armed forces (US, French and Turkish 
troops are stationed in Syria and Iraq, mostly in Kurdish majority regions) and 
their unclear political status suggest that both countries have not accepted their 
decline into class C states. Their future status remains therefore an open 
question. 
                                               
78  Bloomberg, “Saudi Arabia planning to build its own defense industry”, 4 March 2018, 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/politics- economics/391412-saudi-arabia-planning-to-
build-its-own-defence-industry. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
79  Tuqa Khalid, “U.S. forces to stay in Iraq as long as needed”, reuters.com, 19 August 
2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-usa/u-s-forces-to-stay-in-
iraq-as-long-as-needed-spokesman-idUSKBN1L408A. (Accessed 30 August 2018). 
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 Finally, the smaller regional states Qatar, Oman, Lebanon and Jordan 
all lack means for their own defence and their survival is due to agreements 
between stronger regional and global powers to maintain them. In the case of 
Qatar, for example, the hosting of the largest US military base in the Middle 
East and state survival are closely related. The concluding section now 
evaluates the revealed preferences of state actors engaged in the Syrian conflict 
to answer the question whether a regional balance of power is likely to re-
emerge in the Middle East region. 
 
 
Conclusion: Will The Balance Of Power In The Middle East 
Be Restored? 
 
 There exists no singular balance of power in the Middle East but multi-
level balance; local, regional and global (or extra-regional) levels interact and 
must be jointly evaluated in the analytical context of state hierarchy. This is the 
basic insight of peripheral realism theory discussed in the previous section and 
of some other realist and structuralist approaches in international relations 
theory. These approaches share the view that “[t]he fundamental ordering 
principle of international politics is hierarchy, not equality”.80 Instead of 
assuming that states are basically equal in their search for security under 
conditions of anarchy, as argued by most versions of realist IR theory, the PR 
approach acknowledges that states differ systematically, according to their 
position in the regional and global hierarchy, and that the degree of autonomy 
of state executives in the Middle East is determined by their relative position. 
 In order to restore the local and regional balance in the Middle East, the 
factor of external intervention is therefore crucial. In fact, coordinating the three 
levels of hierarchy is difficult due to the absence of consensus on how the 
Middle East region is supposed to function. On the one hand, the US and Israel 
aspire to control all regional states directly or by means of local proxy forces. 
On the other hand, Russia and China aspire to a multipolar world order and 
selectively support states that reject the US and Israeli plans for the region. 
Nevertheless, the external actors must also coordinate their behaviour to some 
extent in order to avoid escalating the local multi-level proxy conflicts into 
direct clashes between the great powers. Thus, restoring multi-level balance is 
required to end the Syrian conflict. 
 During the Cold War period, US and Soviet external intervention in the 
Middle East helped to establish a reasonably stable bipolar (although US-
dominated) regional system. In this context, a number of other powers, such as 
                                               
80  Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2017, p. 1. 
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the UK, France and China, played minor roles in the Middle East without 
questioning overall regional bipolarity. Under these conditions, wars were 
fought in short bursts (the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars) and escalation 
beyond the regional level was avoided by the external actors. As a result, local 
state stability was usually guaranteed, not least because all regional 
authoritarian regimes were backed up from outside. 
 The end of the Cold War removed regional bipolarity and the US and 
Israel undertook efforts to take advantage of the new situation. The US target 
was and is to establish full regional hegemony by making all Middle Eastern 
states accept permanent US military bases.
81
 Such bases constitute the material 
precondition to exercise US veto power over political and economic efforts of 
other external actors in the region – especially Russia and China – and can 
potentially be financed out of “contributions” of the states that are serving as 
hosts. In this context, regional military conflict further increases the dependency 
of local clients on US protection. This is the major reason why the US is on 
balance unlikely to permanently change borders in the region – their credibility 
as external backer of state units depends on maintaining the status quo. 
 Nevertheless, the US plan to gain control of all state units in the Greater 
Middle East has so far not been successful. Instead, four states targeted for 
regime change – Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Somalia – have collapsed, although Iraq 
has recently re-gained some degree of statehood and autonomy due to the 
nominal US withdrawal in 2011.
82
 The three other regional states mentioned by 
US politicians as targets, namely Lebanon, Syria and Iran, have so far resisted 
US-led regime change efforts. Post-Cold War US behaviour in the region has 
generally followed the pattern established during the lengthy US campaign 
against Iraq between 1991 and 2003: permanent pressure, economic sanctions 
targeting the population at large and continuous and escalating “partial” 
offences against state sovereignty such as aerial bombing. 
 Under the Bush Jr., Obama and Trump administrations, this “formula” 
has been supplemented with rising degrees of covert warfare activities, such as 
special force and drone attacks and the sponsorship and arming of insurgents. 
These US actions have established “war as a way of life” and have dramatically 
decreased the future developmental potential of the Arab world. The 
humanitarian and environmental costs of these US policy choices in the Arab 
region have produced large-scale refugee and migration waves that have 
partially affected the EU countries. This has in turn strongly questioned the 
                                               
81  Mohssen Massarrat, “Demokratisierung des Greater Middle East”, Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, vol. 45, 7 November 2005, pp. 30-37. 
82  It is difficult to evaluate the degree of restoration of Iraqi statehood and sovereignty. It 
can be safely assumed that the US infrastructure for resumption of occupation is still in 
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internal political stability of the EU as documented by the rise of anti-
immigration movements in most EU member states. 
 At the time of writing, there are two scenarios for the future of Syria. 
Either the conflict is going to be ended based on a political settlement or, 
alternatively, new efforts will be made on the part of the US and its regional and 
local allies to keep the war going – based on introducing new and escalating 
existing conflict lines and by drip-feeding more weapons into the conflict zones. 
Both scenarios are conceivable. In this context, President Trump’s occasional 
rhetorical “triangulation” suggesting US withdrawal from Syria is most likely to 
act as camouflage to distract public attention from the massive concentration of 
US naval forces in the Mediterranean and the slow but steady build-up of US 
land forces in the north-eastern parts of Syria, in addition to the large-scale US 
sponsorship of the Saudi war in Yemen. This regional US policy based on 
military force is also supported by Israeli politicians and is supposed to contain 
Iran. In this context, US demands for Iranian withdrawal from Syria are a 
thinly-veiled effort to break the strategic alliance between the two countries that 
has been in place since the 1980s and serves as another US excuse to occupy 
Syrian territory.  
 In mid-2018, the results of the Syrian conflict are as follows: the “Axis 
of Resistance” made up of Syria, Iran and Hezbollah has not been broken and 
the Syrian government has succeeded in taking back around 80 per cent of the 
national territory. Russia has strengthened its traditional role as a veto power 
with regard to Syria due to its limited military intervention since 2015 tipping 
the balance in favour of Damascus. In diplomatic terms, Russia has strongly 
engaged by negotiating with all local and regional actors. This has clarified that 
no solution is possible in Syria without Russia’s endorsement. The US and the 
EU countries have refused to join this process, however. Iran has also defended 
its regional position, although the domestic economic cost for supporting Syria 
has been increasingly felt by the Iranian people. Crucially, any defeat in Syria 
would result in a follow-up US and Israeli offensive against Iran. 
 As a country currently balancing between both sides of the conflict, 
Turkey has taken advantage of the unclear geopolitical situation in the north of 
Syria. The country had initially, since at least 2012, served as the principal 
external platform for the Islamist insurgents to attack the Syrian state under the 
guidance of Turkey’s intelligence agencies. More recently, since 2018, the 
Erdogan government has started to collect the spoils of war by occupying the 
north-western corner of Syria. It also aims to realise further gains by linking up 
with Russia and Iran in order to act as a guaranteeing power for the “de-
escalation zone” around the north-western city of Idlib. In parallel, Turkey has 
complained to the US about the latter’s backing of the Kurdish militias (YPG) 
in the Syrian territories south of the Euphrates River, fearing that these militias 
could be used against Turkey at some future point. By mid-2018, the US began 
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accommodating Turkish demands: joint “patrolling” of Turkish and US troops 
on Syrian territories around the predominantly Kurdish city of Manbij, located 
in the northeast of Aleppo Governorate, started in June of 2016, signalling a 
degree of mutual accommodation of Turkish and US regional interests. 
 This directly relates to the larger US strategy with regard to Syria. Once 
again, one must stress the continuity of US goals since 2003, namely to enforce 
either regime change in Damascus or, alternatively, to take over as much 
territory and resources as possible to ensure that what remains of Syria is 
economically unviable. By occupying the territories east of the Euphrates River, 
the US controls a large share (up to 90 per cent) of Syria’s oil and gas 
production and much of the fertile soil necessary to feed Syria. 
According to a recently leaked diplomatic report, the US currently 
focuses on dividing Syria by separating the territory east of the Euphrates River 
and by reorganizing the local militias in this region in a way that weakens the 
Kurdish (YPG) element and strengthens other local Arab forces willing to 
collaborate with the US, to invite Turkey to participate in the occupation of the 
eastern sectors of Syria and to boycott the Sochi peace conference organised by 
Russia and any other Russia-led peace process. Instead, the US intend to focus 
exclusively on the Geneva-based Syria talks under the auspices of the United 
Nations special envoy Staffan de Mistura in order to transmit US preferences to 
the other actors.
83
 The US also appears to be interested in inviting more and 
more actors (France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and UAE) to send troops to the 
Syrian territory east of the Euphrates following the concept of “safety in 
numbers”. Having France participate in the occupation of Syria also helps to 
silence any scruples on the part of some EU states holding on to the concept of 
the EU as a “norm entrepreneur”. Those who directly participate are in no 
position to complain any more. 
 As for the Arab monarchies, they have all heavily invested into war-
making in Syria and Yemen and have in recent years purchased record amounts 
of US, British and French military supplies. They have also funded and supplied 
the Islamist groups which, in turn, have largely removed the presence of the 
Syrian state from the territories east of the Euphrates River – this was referred 
to in US intelligence reports as the creation of a “Salafist principality in eastern 
Syria”.84 Islamist militias such as ISIS have in turn largely been destroyed by 
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aerial bombing and the Kurdish YPG fighting them on the ground with US 
support. In this manner, the territory has been fought over twice and it might 
now be the turn of the Kurds to be replaced by other US auxiliaries. In any case, 
the Arab monarchies have lost their geopolitical investment and their 
dependence on US protection is near absolute. None of the involved states have 
any realistic prospects for upward mobility in the regional hierarchy of states. 
 Finally, Israel has made use of the Syrian war to further expand its 
regional “strategic depth”. While it has offended against Lebanese sovereignty 
for many years, by violating its airspace on a practically daily basis, it has now 
also added the Syrian airspace to its zone of operations (with the exception of 
sectors of Syrian airspace “reserved” for US and Russian forces and backed up 
by air defence systems). Israel and the US continue to act jointly in the region, 
but play different tactical roles. 
 To conclude, the Syrian war has highlighted that hard power – military 
force – is routinely applied at the end of the second decade of the 21st century. 
The driving force in this conflict over world order is the US with Israel, a set of 
Arab client regimes and powers such as France and the UK. New-style US-led 
“forever wars” have now filled the first two decades of the new century 
producing a world of rapidly diminishing resources and eradicating the joint 
cultural heritage of humanity in many parts of the Middle East. In this context, 
the Syrian population is collectively punished for living in the wrong place at 
the wrong time. This conflict is a warning call about what could happen in other 
places in the near future. 
 
 
